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This dissertation contributes to the literature concerning horizontal merger
efficiencies and non-price competition in merger analysis. It focuses on the U.S.
premium bottled water industry, where manufacturers face both price and non-
price competitions. Chapter 1 gives an overview of this dissertation and chapter 2
to chapter 4 are three papers that the dissertation features.
In chapter 2, I study the market power and marginal cost efficiency that was
created following the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau in the U.S. premium bot-
tled water market by assuming a vertical relationship between upstream manufac-
tures and downstream retailers. In this framework, bottled water manufacturers
are assumed to compete solely in prices and product attributes are exogenous. My
supply-side model allows for a merger efficiency on Glaceau products by including
an indicator for Glaceau products post-merger in the marginal cost function. With
counterfactual simulations based on the demand and supply-side estimates, I show
the merger has limited impacts on market power while marginal cost efficiency plays
an important role in affecting the equilibrium prices and market shares post-merger.
In chapter 3, I develop a conceptual framework by extending the vertical re-
lation in chapter 2 to incorporate multi-dimension non-price competitions. This
conceptual framework can be applied to consumer good industries with both price
and non-price competitions. In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of
model derivations, estimation strategies, and counterfactual simulations.
In chapter 4, I apply the framework developed in chapter 3 to the merger
of Coca-Cola and Glaceau and explore how horizontal merger efficiencies affect the
equilibrium market outcomes considering both price and non-price competitions. To
understand the underlying mechanisms that rationalize Glaceau’s significant boosts
in market shares, product varieties, and advertising expenditures post-merger, I esti-
mate a structural demand and supply model where manufacturers choose wholesale
prices, product varieties, and advertising, and I allow for several types of efficiencies
on Glaceau. With counterfactual simulations, I show how marginal cost, product
variety fixed cost, and advertising fixed cost efficiencies affect equilibrium market
outcomes and consumer welfares.
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Chapter 1: Overview
This dissertation features three papers exploring the effects of horizontal merger
efficiencies on equilibrium market outcomes and consumer welfares in the U.S. bot-
tled water industry. Horizontal mergers are prevalent economic activities across
many industries, which may have significant effects on the market structure, compe-
tition, and consumer welfares. Most existing empirical studies in horizontal merger
focus exclusively on unilateral effects of differentiated products, and little work has
been done examining the effects of horizontal merger on synergies or efficiencies.
Without merger efficiencies, the horizontal merger is prone to increase market power
and thus increases prices and reduces outputs, which may significantly lessen com-
petition and impair consumer welfares. Considering merger synergies or efficiencies,
merging parties can share technology, patents, management, labor, distribution net-
work and business partnership with each other and thus reduced relative marginal
cost and fixed costs. In this case, reduced cost via merger efficiencies allows the merg-
ing parties to lower prices after the merger, which strengthens competition and is
beneficial to the consumer. The co-existence of market power and merger efficiency
makes horizontal merger analysis complicated since they affect prices in opposite
directions. With non-price competition, market power and merger efficiency affect
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both price and non-price factors, such as product quality, product variety, innova-
tion, service level, and advertising intensity. In this dissertation, focusing on the
merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau (manufacturer of Vitaminwater and Smartwater)
in the U.S. bottled water industry, I investigate how market power, merger efficien-
cies, and non-price competition play roles in affecting equilibrium market outcomes
and consumer welfares.
The paper in chapter 2 investigates how marginal cost efficiency plays a role in
affecting equilibrium prices, market shares, and consumer welfares. In this chapter,
I focus on the “trade-off” effect between market power and marginal cost efficiency
after the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau, and assume a Nash-Bertrand compe-
tition between premium bottled water manufacturers. I use the standard random
coefficient logit model (e.g. Berry et al. (1995), BLP hereafter; Nevo (2000)) to
estimate consumer demand, and the estimation results suggest that the premium
bottled water products are highly differentiated. My supply-side model follows
Villas-Boas (2007)’s approach by incorporating a vertical relationship between up-
stream manufacturers and downstream retailers. To capture the merger efficiency
on Glaceau post-merger, I include an indicator for Glaceau products in the marginal
cost function in post-merger periods. My supply-side estimates suggest the merger
on average reduced the marginal cost of Vitaminwater products by 4.4%-5.3%. I im-
plement several counterfactual scenarios to identify the effects of merger on market
power and marginal cost efficiency. I find the merger has limited impacts on market
power while marginal cost efficiency plays an important role in affecting equilibrium
prices and market shares. In particular, I find the marginal cost efficiency explains
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about 20% of the market share boosts in Glaceau products in 2009 compared to the
“no merger” baseline.
The second paper in chapter 3 develops a conceptual framework which incor-
porates consumer demand, retailer’s pricing, and manufacturer’s price and non-price
competitions. This conceptual framework can be applied to industries with the ver-
tical structure between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers that face
both price and no-price competitions. The demand-side model extends the random
coefficient logit framework (BLP) by incorporating endogenous product attributes.
This setting is similar to Fan (2013)’s framework and I allow endogenous product
attributes to affect consumer utility nonlinearly. The supply-side model builds on
Villas-Boas (2007)’s framework and I extend the model by allowing manufacturers
to choose endogenous product attributes in addition to wholesale prices when maxi-
mizing profits. In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of model derivations,
estimation strategies, and counterfactual simulations.
The final paper in chapter 4 applies the framework developed in chapter 3 to
the U.S. premium bottled water industry. In this paper, I investigate how horizontal
merger efficiencies affect equilibrium market outcomes considering both price and
non-price competitions. Focusing on a recent merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau,
which is the manufacturer of Vitaminwater and Smartwater in the U.S. premium
bottled water market, I quantify efficiencies that were created following the merger
between those two manufacturers. To understand the underlying mechanisms that
rationalize Glaceau’s significant boosts in market shares, product varieties, and
advertising expenditures post-merger, I estimate a structural demand and supply
3
model where manufacturers choose wholesale prices, product varieties, and adver-
tising, and I allow for several types of efficiencies. With counterfactual simulations,
I show how marginal cost, product variety fixed cost, and advertising fixed cost
efficiencies affected equilibrium market outcomes. My results suggest that in a
highly differentiated industry with competitions in multiple dimensions, the hor-
izontal merger which appears to be “bad” may turn out to be “good” through
efficiency gains, without hurting other competitors and consumers.
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Chapter 2: Market Power and Merger Efficiency: A Case in the U.S.
Bottled Water Industry
2.1 Introduction
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are important and prevalent phenomena in
the modern economy. Mergers may increase market power, but they can also create
significant benefits for consumers. There are a number of empirical research papers
that focus exclusively on the unilateral effects of the horizontal merger through
internalizing sales of differentiated products produced by the merging parties (e.g.
Berry and Pakes (1993); Nevo (2000)), or the increased market power post-merger
(e.g. Kim and Singal (1993); Nevo (2001); Capps et al. (2003)). However, little work
has been done examining the effects of horizontal merger on efficiencies (Whinston
(2003)), or to empirically evaluate the trade-offs between market power and merger
efficiencies.
This paper studies the economic effects of the horizontal merger of Coca-Cola
Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts
Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The
conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect the views
of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and
preparing the results reported herein.
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and Glaceau in the U.S. premium bottled water industry. In May 2007, Coca-Cola
announced its proposed acquisition of Glaceau which is the manufacturer of Vita-
minwater and Smartwater for over $4 billion. This proposed merger was quickly
approved by the U.S. antitrust agencies without any anticompetitive concerns. By
2011, one of Glaceau’s flagship brands, Vitaminwater, increased annual revenues
from $350 million to more than $1 billion (INVESTOPEDIA (2015)). 1 With
retailer scanner data, I find that after the merger the market shares of Glaceau
brands (Vitaminwater and Smartwater) increased significantly in many U.S. regions,
while price variations were quite similar to other flavored brands. These observed
post-merger market outcomes contrast with the existing literature that suggests
horizontal mergers tend to be “bad” by increasing market power, thus hurting con-
sumers. In addition, I find the retail prices of Vitaminwater decreased slightly in the
post-merger period, suggesting plausible merger synergies or efficiencies on Glaceau
products.
To evaluate the market power and synergies or efficiencies that were created
after the merger, I develop a structural model of demand and supply that allows for
post-merger efficiency change in marginal cost for Glaceau products. My research
focus is on premium bottled water products which include top-sale spring water,
purified water, and enhanced water in the U.S. market. For the consumer demand
estimation, following the existing literature such as Nevo (2000), Villas-Boas (2007),




veloped by Berry et al. (1995), henceforth BLP, to estimate consumer substitution
patterns with heterogeneous tastes for each product. Consistent with the related
literature in the bottled water industry, the demand estimates imply small substi-
tution effects between bottled water products within the choice set (e.g. Bonnet
and Dubois (2010)). In addition, I find bottled water consumers are more likely to
switch to cheap outside choices when facing a price increase, suggesting that pre-
mium products are highly differentiated, and Glaceau’s increases in market shares
after the merger were largely from cheap outside products.
The supply model involves the vertical relationship between upstream manu-
facturers and downstream retailers. The pricing games between manufacturers and
retailers yield two-stages. In the first stage, I assume that bottled water manufac-
turers choose wholesale prices in each market knowing that retailers will respond
based on their choices. In the second stage, a monopolist retailer chooses corre-
sponding retail prices given manufacturers’ optimal choices for wholesale prices.
Following Ellickson et al. (2017), I assume retailers incur no marginal cost or fixed
cost of retailing. To back-out manufacturers’ price-cost margins with limited data, I
apply Villas-Boas (2007)’s approach which recovers manufacturers’ price-cost mar-
gins from retailer’s optimal pricing given consumers’ substitution patterns from the
demand estimates. To capture the merger synergies or efficiencies on Glaceau prod-
ucts post-merger, I include an indicator for Glaceau products in the marginal cost
function in the post-merger period. The supply-side estimates suggest the merger
created efficiencies for Glaceau in reducing the marginal cost post-merger. In par-
ticular, I find that the merger reduced Glaceau’s marginal cost by 6.04 cents per
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liter on average comparing to its pre-merger marginal cost on average, controlling
for time and region fixed effects.
With both demand and supply estimates, I conduct several counterfactual
simulations to separately identify the effects of market power and efficiency on mar-
ket outcomes: (i) the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau does not occur; (ii) the
merger occurs with only unilateral effect; (iii) the merger occurs with both uni-
lateral effect and marginal cost efficiency (real data). I find a limited increase in
market power post-merger comparing to the “no merger” baseline, while marginal
cost efficiency plays a significant role in reducing prices. In particular, for the year
2009, I find compared to the “no merger” baseline, the merger with observed data
(1) reduces Glaceau’s retail prices by about 3.8%-5.3%, and (2) boosts Glaceau’s
market shares by 17.9%-15.7%. Additionally, the merger increases consumer surplus
by 13.5% compared to the “no merger” baseline. Without marginal cost efficiency,
my counterfactual simulations suggest the merger would not only increase prices for
the merging party but also decrease consumer surplus.
This paper contributes to several aspects of the literature on horizontal merger
analysis. First, it contributes to the literature on market power and price compe-
tition. For example, focusing on the airline industry, Kim and Singal (1993) study
the effect of merger on airline fares and find that merging airlines raised fares sig-
nificantly on routes they serve compared to other routes. Nevo (2001) measures
the market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. This paper concentrates on
the premium bottled water industry and empirically measures the market power
changes after a merger.
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Second, this study relates to literature on horizontal merger efficiency. Dating
back to the 1960s, Williamson (1968) proposes a framework to evaluate the welfare
trade-off between efficiency gains and prices increases when conducting merger anal-
ysis. Ashenfelter et al. (2015) study the Miller-Coors joint venture in the U.S. beer
industry and assess the effects of increased market concentration and efficiencies
on pricing. Considering the ready-mix concrete industry, Kulick (2017) investigates
cost efficiencies of horizontal mergers among concrete plants in the U.S. Building on
these studies, this paper quantifies the marginal cost efficiency and market power of
a horizontal merger between two bottled water manufacturers.
At last, this study relates to the strand of literature that considers vertical
relationships between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers. Villas-
Boas (2007) develops a feasible framework to recover yogurt manufacturers’ price-
cost margins when data of wholesale prices are not available. Gayle (2013) extends
this vertical framework to the airline fare market and explores the efficiency of code-
share contracts between airlines. Ellickson et al. (2017) apply the vertical framework
to the single-serve-brew coffee market and study how bilateral bargaining between
manufacturers and retails would affect retail profitability on private labels. In terms
of industry, the closest study to this paper is Bonnet and Dubois (2010), which




As is the case for most consumer product industries, bottled water manu-
facturers compete primarily in prices. There exists a vertical structure between
upstream bottled water manufacturers and downstream retailers in which manufac-
turers decide wholesale prices and retailers choose corresponding retail prices. The
bottled water sector in the U.S. is highly concentrated. Nestle, Pepsi, Coca-Coca,
and retailers’ own brands account for the more than 80% of the total market shares.
Bottled water products are further classified as purified, spring, imported, and fla-
vored water products based on water sources and ingredients. In terms of unit price,
bottled water brands can be categorized as “premium” brand and “cheap brand”.
Bottled water of premium brand is normally sold as a single-bottle or small packs
with much higher per-unit prices compared to other products. The premium brands
include imported and enhanced water brands. Bottled water of cheap brand is sold
either as big packs or in large containers, and constitutes the majority of bottled
water market shares.
2.3 Data Sources
My primary data source is the Nielsen Retailer Scanner Data which covers
the sample period from January 2006 to December 2009. The data include retail
prices and unit sales by UPC code on a weekly basis for a sample of grocery stores,
convenience stores, drug stores, large merchandisers and liquor stores. Focusing on
10
10 top-sale premium bottled water brands, I restrict the estimation samples to 52
grocery retailer chains in 92 distinct geographic regions. According to the Nielsen
Company, a geographic region is defined as the Designated Market Area (DMA),
which includes one or more metropolitan areas within a certain distance. To reduce
estimation bias, my estimation samples only include DMA regions with at least two
grocery chains in the Nielsen data. Grocery chains in a given DMA region often
operate a few hundred individual stores respectively and many of them also operate
business in adjacent regions. For the retail industry, pricing and promotion decisions
are normally made at the region-chain level, which allows me to define the market
as a region-retailer pair. This market definition is the same as Ellickson et al. (2017)
who study the U.S. single-serve-brew coffee industry.
The bottled water brands of this paper come from the Nielsen classification of
“Water-Bottled”, which excludes carbonated and energy beverages. I collect top-
sale bottled water brands within this Nielsen category and further classify these
brands into premium and cheap brands based on their per-unit prices. On average,
in a region-retailer pair market, each retailer’s own water brand takes up to one
third of the total market shares. For national brands, Nestle accounts for about
30% of the market shares and focuses on cheap products with either big-packs or
large containers. Pepsi and Coca-Cola have both flavored and non-flavored water
brands, and their products account for about 9% and 10% of the total bottled water
market shares respectively.
The basic unit of study is the brand-package level and I aggregate all UPC
code level data to the brand-package level. Moreover, I classify products of the
11
same brand into 2 groups: single-pack and multi-pack. So for each brand, I have
two “products” as the basic unit of study. The focus of this study is on the premium
water brands so I include 10 top-sale premium bottled water brands in the choice
set and treat other brands as outside options. 2 Aggregating week-level data to
month-level yields 146,107 sample observations at the region-chain-product-month-
year level over 2006-2009.3 To capture consumer heterogeneity and improve demand
estimation, I include household demographics from the Nielsen Household Panel as
supplementary data source. In particular, for each year and DMA region, I randomly
select 50 households and record their household income for later use.
2.3.1 Retail Prices and Market Shares
Figure 1 presents the average retail prices of 3 flavored water brands, Vita-
minwater, Propel, and Fruit2O over 2006 to 2009. The trends in the figure are
calculated at the region-retailer level, which measure the average prices of these 3
brands in a representative regional retailer. The vertical red line at July 2007 signi-
fies the time when the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau is completed. As suggested
in the figure, all 3 flavored brands have similar small downward sloping time trends
in retail prices over time, suggesting prices of flavored water are declining steadily
over time. I find the price of Vitaminwater fluctuates more than other brands.
Figure 2 plots the average market shares of Vitaminwater, Propel, and Fruit2O
2I find Dasani’s unit prices differ significantly across package and container sizes. For single
bottle products with container size less than 1 liter, the unit price of Dasani is almost 3 times higher
than products with larger container or multi-packs. Thus I exclude multi-pack and big-container
Dasani from the premium bottled water category. In the rest of this paper, “Dasani” means single
bottle Dasani products which belong to the premium water category based on unit price.
3Product and brand-package pair are used interchangeably.
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over 2006 to 2009. It is obvious that the market share of Vitaminwater increases
significantly in the post-merger period. However, the market shares of Propel and
Fruit2O don’t increase even though these 2 brands have similar declining price trends
with Vitaminwater. In particular, the market share of Fruit2O reduces in the post-
merger period. It seems the increase in Vitaminwater shares after the merger is
due to price effect, but for flavored brands, Fruit2O and Propel, price effects are not
significant in affecting shares. It is possible that consumers of Vitaminwater are more
price elastic than consumers of other flavored brands, and consumer substitution




For the demand estimation, I use the random coefficient logit model developed
by BLP. Suppose in a given market r and time period t, each individual consumer
i can purchase product j from a set of consumer products GJ or choose an outside
option. The utility that consumer i receives from purchasing product j (brand-
package) in market r at time t is given by:
uijrt = αipjrt + βiXjrt + ξjrt + εijrt (2.1)
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where Xjrt includes a set of observable product attributes and region and time fixed
effects, and pjrt denotes the observable retail price. ξjrt is the unobserved product
attributes or quality valuations specific to market r at time t, and εijrt is a consumer
specific stochastic term.
Most bottled water products contain no obvious attributes but “water”, which
makes it difficult to include specific product attributes in the model. To address
this issue, I use the same approach of Nevo (2000) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010)
who use product fixed effects to capture the time-invariant product attributes. In
order to capture each consumer’s heterogeneous tastes for different products, I allow
coefficients of some variables to be varying across the local population by interacting
them with household income draws




where I inci denotes per-capita household income of household or consumer i, ᾱ and
β̄ are the mean effects across population.4 The indirect utility function defined
above can be further decomposed into a constant part δjrt(pjrt, Xjrt, ξjrt; ᾱ, β̄), plus
a random part µijrt(pjrt, Xjrt, I
inc
i ; Π) such that
uijrt = δjrt + µijrt + εijrt. (2.3)
The first term, δjrt = ᾱpjrt + β̄Xjrt + ξjrt represents the mean utility of purchasing
4For each DMA region, I take 50 draws of household income, and allow these income draws to
be correlated with the price coefficient.
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product j in market r at time t across all consumers, and the second term, µijrt
represents the consumer-specific taste deviations from the mean.
For simplicity, I normalize the mean utility of purchasing outside good to
zero. The idiosyncratic error terms εijrt are assumed to be iid draws from the Type
I extreme value distribution. For a given market r with J products in the choice







c=1 exp(δcrt + µicrt)
dF (I inc), (2.4)
where F (.) is a cumulative distribution function of consumer income.
2.4.2 Demand Estimation
The random coefficient demand model is estimated by the fixed point algo-
rithm developed proposed by BLP via the generalized method of moments (GMM).
As suggested by existing literature, it is necessary to use appropriate instrumental
variables to reduce estimation bias since retail prices may be correlated with unob-
served product attributes and demand shocks. BLP suggest a set of instruments
which are measures of isolation in product space and include the summation of (i)
product attributes of other products by the same manufacturer in the same market,
and (ii) product attributes of other products produced by other manufacturers in
the same market. Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2000) use the so-called Hausman type
of instruments which are prices in other markets. Cost shifters such as input prices
and wage rates are also widely used in related empirical studies. In this paper, in
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addition to the BLP type instruments, I include instrumental variables that share
features of both Hausman type and cost shifter type instruments. Particularly, for
each given market, I use the retail prices in the 3 geographically nearest markets of
other states as instrumental variables.
Table 1 presents partial results of demand estimation for logit and random
coefficient logit models. The logit demand model is a simplified version of random
coefficient model which restricts all nonlinear demand parameters to be zeros. It
can be estimated easily with a two stage least square approach (2SLS) with appro-
priate instrumental variables. For the random coefficient model, I allow per-capita
household income to be correlated with consumer’s preference for price, the constant
term, and package size (multi-pack dummy). To better identify nonlinear param-
eters, I create additional instrumental variables by interacting the average income
across individuals with the mean price of the three geographically nearest regions,
the constant, and package size. Regression observations are at the brand-package-
region-month-year level and both models contain product, region, and time fixed
effects. The mean price coefficient is -2.140 and -2.408 for the logit model and ran-
dom coefficient model respectively, suggesting a downward sloping demand function
under both specifications. 5 The mean own-price elasticities from both models are
close in magnitude and random coefficient logit model yields a more elastic demand
function.







where subscripts i,j, and r denote individual draw, product, and market. N and M represents
the number of draws of each market and the total number of markets in the estimation sample.
I also find all consumer-specific price coefficients αi are negative for all sample observations and
individual consumer draws.
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Table 2 and table 3 present the mean own-price and cross-price elasticities
across 16 premium bottled water products. On average, consumers are less price
elastic to cheaper products, such as Aquafina Splash and Fruit2O, and more price
elastic to more expensive products, such as Vitaminwater. For example, a 1% de-
crease in the price of multi-pack Fruit2O will increase its demand by about 2.6%,
but the same proportion of price reduction in Vitaminwater will boost Vitamin-
water’s demand by more than 4%. The demand-side estimates are consistent with
Miller and Weinberg (2017) who suggest own-price elasticities tend to be higher
for more expensive products in their analysis of price substitution patterns among
beers. I show that cross-price elasticities of bottled water products are relative small
in magnitude, which are consistent with findings of Bonnet and Dubois (2010), who
estimate bottled water demand in French market.
Tables 4 and 5 show the diversion ratios of inside and outside bottled water
products. The diversion ratio measures the fraction of consumers that substitute
from one product to the other after a price increase. For differentiated products with
Bertrand competition, any two of them are highly differentiated or substitutable if
the diversion ratio between them is low. Following Conlon and Mortimer (2018),
I define the diagonal elements as the diversion to the outside good rather than -
1. According to the definition, if all products are substitutes and consumers make
discrete choices, each row of the diversion matrix must sum to one. Each row j in
table 4 represents the diversion ratios of product j’s lost shares to different products
when product j increases price. For example, single-bottle Evian’s diversion to the
outside good and single-bottle Dasani are 95.98% and 0.28% respectively, which
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means when Evian increases its price by 1%, about 96% of Evian’s lost shares
go to outside products and only about 0.3% of Evian’s lost shares go to single-
bottle Dasani. I find the diversion ratios to the outside good are very large in
magnitude, which echoes the cross-price elasticities reported in tables 2 and 3 that
inside premium bottled water products are highly differentiated.
2.5 Supply
2.5.1 Retailers’ Pricing
Following Villas-Boas (2007) and Ellickson et al. (2017), I assume the supply
model yields two stages where upstream manufacturers choose wholesale prices in
the first stage and downstream retailers choose corresponding retail prices in the
second stage given manufacturers’ choices. 6 This two-stage game can be solved
backward starting from retailer’s pricing decisions. Similar to Ellickson et al. (2017),
I assume that retailers carry no marginal cost of retailing and are monopolists in







rct − pWrct)Srct, (2.5)
where Grt is the set of products that retailer R sells in market r at time t, Mrt
denotes the market size, Srct is the market share of product c in market r at time
t, pRrct is retail price of product c set by retailer R, and p
W
rct denotes the wholesale
6Villas-Boas (2007) assumes Nash-Betrand competition among oligopolist retailers while Ellick-
son et al. (2017) retailers are monopolists
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price of product c set by the manufacturer. 7 Taking first-order derivatives of the









Following Villas-Boas (2007), define ΩRrt as retailer R’s response matrix, which con-
tains the first order derivatives of product shares with respect to all retail prices in


























Stacking the first order conditions above and rearranging them yields a J ×1 vector
of monopolist retailer’s price-cost margins 8
pRrt − pWrt = −ΩRrt(prt)−1Srt. (2.8)
Using the monopolist retailer’s pricing equation in (2.8), manufacturers’ wholesale
prices pWrt can be computed from demand estimates, observed market shares, and
retail prices.
7I assume market size Mrt of market r is constant in a given year, and it is 10% greater than
the maximum observed sales among bottled water category within each market. This definition of
market size is similar to Miller and Weinberg (2017) who look at the U.S. beer industry.
8Vectors and matrices are denoted as bold symbols in the remaining of this paper.
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2.5.2 Manufacturers’ Pricing
In the first stage of game, each manufacturer chooses wholesale prices with full
information about how these decisions would affect the optimal behaviors of rival
manufacturers and the downstream retailer. In particular, the first order conditions












Equation (2.10) suggests that manufacturers’ wholesale prices affect equilibrium
market shares indirectly through retailer’s best responses.
Suppose manufacturer m offers a bundle of products Grm, which contains Nm
products in a market r to a monopolist retailer at time t. Then manufacturer m’s






jrt − cWjrt)Sjrt(prt), (2.11)
where cWjrt represents the marginal cost of producing, shipping and distributing prod-
uct j to market r at time t. I assume that the marginal cost is different across prod-
ucts. Following Grennan (2013) and Miller and Weinberg (2017), I parameterize
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marginal cost as linear function of explanatory variables:
cwjrt = Ψj + γr + ηt + ωjrt, (2.12)
where Ψj denotes the fixed effect of producing product j, γr and ηt are sets of region-
specific and period-specific fixed effects, and ωjrt is unobservable cost shifters.
To capture the merger efficiency or synergy on Glaceau products post-merger,
I include an indicator 1{Glaceau Post-Merger} for Glaceau products n the marginal
cost function in the post-merger period, thus the fixed effect of producing product





Glaceau × 1{Glaceau Post-Merger}. (2.13)
where Ψ0j measures the average baseline production and distribution cost for product
j, and ΨpostGlaceau measures Glaceau’s cost changes post-merger.
The manufacturer’s profit can be derived as a function of its wholesale prices









With manufacturer’s profit function specified above and knowing that retailers be-
have according to equation (2.8), the manufacturer’s optimal pricing decisions will
be acquired by taking the first order derivatives with respect to wholesale prices.








+ Sjrt = 0, ∀j ∈ Grm. (2.15)
The supply model incorporates the vertical relationship between upstream
manufacturers and downstream retailers, and each manufacturer anticipates how
changes in wholesale prices would affect retail price and therefore change consumer
demand. Thus for market r at time t, the effect of wholesale price of product j on
























denotes product j’s wholesale price pass-though to product c’s retail
price. This formula suggests that a change in product j’s wholesale price affects
product c’s demand indirectly through the impact on the equilibrium retail prices
for all products in the game. Define ∆Wrt as the manufacturer’s response matrix in































The system of J by 1 first order conditions can be expressed in matrix form as
pWrt − cWrt = −(T rt ∗∆Wrt )−1Srt, (2.18)
where T rt is a J by J matrix which describes manufacturers’ ownership for J prod-
ucts in market r at time t. Specifically, T rt(j, c) = 1 if products j and c are produced
by the same manufacturer, T rt(j, c) = 0, otherwise. “∗” represents the element by
element multiplication of two matrices. In practice, to reduce computation complex-







Matrix ∆prt describes each product’s wholesale price pass-though to retail prices of
all products, whose general elements are ∆prt(j, c) =
∂pRcrt
∂pWjrt
. ∆prt can be computed
analytically and detailed derivations are presented in the appendix.
To derive the supply-side estimation equation, let’s first add equation (2.8) to
equation (2.18) to obtain the equation as follows
pRrt − cWrt = −(T rt ∗∆Wrt )−1Srt − (ΩRrt)−1Srt. (2.20)
Replacing marginal cost in equation (2.20) with the right-hand side of equation
(2.12), and rearranging terms yields the supply-side estimation equation
pRrt −Ψrt − γr − ηt = −(T rt ∗∆Wrt )−1Srt − (ΩRrt)−1Srt + ωrt. (2.21)
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2.5.3 Supply Estimation
Given demand estimates, observed retail prices, and market shares, manufac-
turer’s response matrices ∆Wrt and Ω
R
rt can be pre-calculated, thus the supply-side
estimation equation in (2.20) reduces to a simple linear regression of cost shifters.
One can use ordinary least square approach to estimate cost-side parameters.
Table 6 presents the mean retailer and manufacturer’s price-cost margins
(markups), and recovered marginal costs based on equations (2.8), (2.18), and (2.20).
As shown in the table, the total channel profits are almost evenly distributed be-
tween manufacturers and monopolist retailers. For example, Propel’s markup is
about $0.37 per liter and its relative retailer’s markup is about $0.41 per liter. In
general, cheaper brands have lower markups and marginal costs while more expen-
sive brands have higher counterparts. On average, Fruit2O is the cheapest premium
water brand which yields the lowest manufacturer markup, retailer markup, and
marginal cost, which are $0.34, $0.38, and $0.24 per liter respectively.
Table 7 presents the key parameter estimates of the supply-side model. As
expected, the merger generates efficiency on Glaceau by reducing corresponding
marginal cost. As shown, in the post-merger period, the average marginal cost
of Glaceau products has been reduced by 6.04 cents per liter controlling for time-
specific and region-specific fixed effects. In particular, for single-bottle and multi-
pack Vitaminwater products, the merger decreases their marginal costs by about
5.3% and 4.4% respectively.
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2.6 Counterfactual Analysis
With both demand and supply-side estimates, I use counterfactual simulations
to investigate how the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau would affect the market
outcomes. Specifically, I perform 2 counterfactual scenarios:
(i) The merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau does not occur.
(ii) The merger occurs with only a unilateral effect.9
For each market (region-chain-time pair), I resolve retailers and manufacturers’ new
equilibrium choices under different market structures by assuming no efficiency on
Glaceau. Manufacturers are assumed to move first, and the new equilibria are solved
by using a two-step procedure. First, with a guess for manufacturers’ wholesale





(pW0 ) that maximizes its profits. Second, with given market and cost structures
and manufacturers’ market shares S∗0 = S
∗(pR
∗
(pW0 )), response matrices ∆
W
0 and
ΩR0 are calculated. The two-step procedure continues until the system of equations
in (2.20) is satisfied under reasonable tolerances. Due to the large sample size and
computational burden, the counterfactual analyses in this paper will focus on the
top 20 retail chains which cover the most DMA regions.10
9In this case, competition between the products of the merging firms is eliminated, allowing
the merged “new” firm to unilaterally exercise market power.
10These top 20 retailer chains operate business in several DMA regions, and I rank them based
on the number of DMA regions they cover. Out of 91 DMA regions in the estimation sample, the
top 1 retailer covers 71 DMA regions and the 20th retailer covers 8. The selected retailers account
for 10,011 markets (75.24% of the sample markets).
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2.6.1 The Predicted Trends of Vitaminwater
In figures 3 to 5 I predict the brand-level retail price, market share, and per-
unit net profit of Vitaminwater under different counterfactual scenarios starting from
January 2006 to December 2009. The “merger-scenario 1” describes the counterfac-
tual scenario that the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau occurs with only unilateral
effects but without efficiencies. Figures 3 to 5 show that the time trends under
“merger-scenario 1” and “no merger” are overlapping and most identical for Vita-
minwater’s retail price, market share, and per-unit net profit. These counterfactual
outcomes suggest that the merger has a very small and insignificant impact on the
market power of Glaceau through unilateral effect. For the pre-merger period, all
predicted time trends under different scenarios are overlapping and identical to the
corresponding observed data, justifying the model’s performance.
Figure 3 plots the time trend of Vitaminwater’s average brand level retail price,
which is weighted by product volumes. As discussed earlier, the unilateral effect of
merger plays a very limited role in affecting the merging party (Glaceau)’s market
power. However, the merge creates efficiency by reducing Glaceau’s marginal cost
and thus decreases Vitaminwater’s retail price compared to the “no merger” sce-
nario. These two findings suggest that (1) the merging party has very small market
power, and (2) marginal cost efficiency plays a vital role in explaining Vitaminwa-
ter’s price reduction after the merger.
Figure 4 presents the average market share of Vitaminwater across sample
regions and retailer chains over 2006-2009. It is obvious that the market share of
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Vitaminwater increases significantly after the merger. Again, the unilateral effect of
merger plays trivial roles in affecting equilibrium market share. Comparing to the
“no merger” baseline, the realized merger increases Vitaminwater’s market share by
more than 10% in each month.
Figure 5 plots the time trend of Vitaminwater’s per-unit net profit. The per-
unit net profit is a measure for firm’s profitability in a given market, which is
computed as the multiplication of the manufacturer’s price-cost margin and the
corresponding market share of each product. The overall time trend of per-unit net
profit is quite similar to that of the market share, which exhibits a significant boost
in the post-merger period. Compared to the “no merger” baseline, I find the merger
with marginal cost efficiency increases Vitaminwater’s per-unit net profit by about
16% on average.
2.6.2 Mean Effects Under Different Merger Scenarios
Table 8 provides the average equilibrium wholesale and retail prices across 20
large retailer chains under different counterfactual scenarios in 2009. The values in
column (i) denote the equilibrium market outcomes from the “no merger” baseline.
The numbers in columns (ii) and (iii) are calculated based on the counterfactual
outcomes from scenario (ii) and the real data respectively, which denote the per-
centage changes relative to the corresponding values of column (i). The numbers
in table 8 suggest that the merger has trivial effects on the equilibrium prices of
competing brands, which can be explained by the small inside good share and weak
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consumer substitution patterns across premium bottled water brands. Comparing
columns (i) and (ii) I find the merger with only unilateral effect generated very lim-
ited market power which increases the wholesale and retail prices of all brands by
less than 1%. As expected, compared to the “no merger” scenario, the percentage
changes in wholesale prices are larger in magnitude than the percentage changes in
corresponding retail prices under both scenario (ii) and (iii), which is due to the
wholesale to retail price pass-through effect. For example, under scenario (ii), the
merger increases Smartwater’s wholesale price by 0.27% but only increases its re-
tail price by 0.2% comparing to the “no merger” scenario. It is evident that the
marginal cost efficiency yields much larger effects on prices than the unilateral effect
of merger. A comparison between columns (i) and (iii) reveals that the merger with
marginal cost efficiency reduces Smartwater and Vitaminwater’s wholesale prices by
6.91% and 4.58%, and decreases their retail prices by 5.26% and 3.80% respectively.
Analogous to table 8, table 9 provides equilibrium market shares, per-unit net
profits, and changes of consumer surplus under different counterfactual scenarios.
All numbers presented in the table are for the year of 2009. A comparison between
columns (i) and (ii) of tables 8 and 9 reveals that the merger with only unilateral
effect reduces market shares of the merging party’s brands. This is due to the price
increases. In particular, compared to the “no merger” baseline, the merger with only
unilateral effect decreases market shares of Smartwater, Vitaminwater, and Dasani
by 0.82%, 0.64%, and 3.19% respectively. More importantly, I find the marginal cost
efficiency explains about 20% of the market share boosts in Glaceau products in the
post-merger period. Relative to the “no merger” baseline in 2009, the realized
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merger with marginal cost efficiency increases markets shares of Smartwater and
Vitaminwater by 19.44% and 17.50% respectively. The unilateral effect (scenario
(ii)) has a very limited impact on per-unit net profit, relative to the marginal cost
efficiency (scenario (iii)). Despite small profit loses in Dasani and competing brands,
I find the merger with marginal cost efficiency increases the per-unit net profits of
Smartwater and Vitaminwater by 17.91% and 15.66% respectively compared to the
“no merger” scenario in 2009.
For consumer welfare, column (ii) reveals the merger with only unilateral effect
decreases consumer surplus by 0.96% relative to the “no merger” baseline. This
result is consistent with the existing antitrust literature focusing on unilateral effect
of horizontal merger. Scenario (ii) is profitable for the merging party but harmful
to consumers, which is unlikely to be approved by antitrust agencies. However,
if considering efficiency in marginal cost, the merger would not only significantly
improve the merging party’s profits but also increase consumer surplus. The realized
merger in column (iii) is predicted to have increased consumer surplus by 13.51%
relative to the “no merger” baseline.
2.7 Conclusion
This study focuses on the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau in the U.S. pre-
mium bottled water industry and investigates how merger efficiency plays roles in
affecting prices, market outcomes, and consumer welfares. To understand the ef-
fect of merger on Glaceau products, I develop a structural demand and supply
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model which incorporates the vertical relationship between manufacturers and re-
tailers and allows for marginal cost efficiency on Glaceau products post-merger. The
demand-side estimates suggest that premium bottled water products are highly dif-
ferentiated which yield low consumer substitution patterns. My supply estimates
suggest the merger generates efficiency on Glaceau through marginal cost reduction.
On average, the merger decreases the marginal cost of Vitaminwater products by
4.4%-5.3%.
With both demand and supply estimates, I implement several counterfactual
scenarios to identify the effects of merger on market power and marginal cost ef-
ficiency. I find the merger has limited impacts on the market power of premium
bottled water products since they are highly differentiated, and marginal cost ef-
ficiency plays an important role in affecting equilibrium prices and market shares.
In particular, for the year 2009, I find compared to the “no merger” scenario, the
realized merger (1) reduces Glaceau’s wholesale prices by 4.6%-6.9%; (2) decreases
Glaceau’s retail prices by 3.8%-5.3%; (3) raises Glaceau’s market shares by 17.5%-
19.4%; and (4) increases Glaceau’s per-unit net profits by 15.7%-17.1%. In addition,
the merger increases consumer surplus by 13.5% compared to the “no merger” base-
line in 2009.
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Chapter 3: A Structural Demand and Supply Framework with En-
dogenous Product Attributes and Non-price Competition
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I develop a conceptual framework which incorporates consumer
demand, retailer’s pricing, and manufacturer’s strategic choices for wholesale prices
and endogenous product attributes considering both price and non-price competi-
tions. In addition to price competition, manufacturers may compete in non-price
aspects as well, such as product quality, product variety, innovation, service level,
and advertising intensity. The conceptual framework in this paper can be applied to
industries with the vertical structure between upstream manufacturers and down-
stream retailers that face both price and no-price competitions.
My demand-side model builds on the standard random coefficient logit model
developed by Berry et al. (1995), henceforth BLP. To capture the impacts of endoge-
nous product attributes on consumer demand, similar to Fan (2013), I include the
observable endogenous product attributes in the consumer utility function. To deal
with consumer heterogeneity, I allow coefficients of price and product attributes
to vary across local population by interacting them with household demograph-
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ics. In addition, I allow consumer utility to affect endogenous product attributes
nonlinearly. The demand model can be estimated with the fixed point algorithm
developed BLP by generalized method of moments (GMM). Since retail price prod-
uct attributes are potentially endogenous, appropriate instrumental variables are
needed to reduce estimation bias. In addition to the BLP type instruments, I pro-
pose to use instrumental variables that share features of both Hausman type and
cost shifter type to instrument endogenous prices and product attributes, such as
price and attributes of the same product in other markets.
The supply-side model incorporates the vertical structure between upstream
manufacturers and downstream retailers and is assumed to be a two-stage static
game. In the first stage, manufacturers simultaneously choose wholesale price and
endogenous product attributes in each market. In the second stage, given manu-
facturers’ choices, retailers decide corresponding retail prices. The two-stage game
is solved backward and one can back-out the monopolist retailer’s price-cost mar-
gin with Villas-Boas (2007)’s approach, given demand estimates, retail prices and
shares. To relax the monopolist retailer assumption and capture the degree of
competition among downstream retailers, I follow Miller and Weinberg (2017)’s ap-
proach by adjusting the monopolist retailer’s markup with a retail scaling parameter.
Manufacturers’ profit in each market is defined as a function of variable profit and
fixed costs of endogenous product attributes. Following Fan (2013)’s model setting,
I assume the derivatives of fixed cost functions with respect to each endogenous
product attribute are linear functions of endogenous product attributes. Manu-
facturers’ optimal choices can be found by taking the first order derivatives with
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respect to wholesale price and endogenous product attributes, and these first order
conditions form the supply side estimation equations. Given demand estimates and
pre-calculated response matrices, marginal cost and fixed cost parameters can be
estimated with GMM. I also provide a detailed procedure to conduct counterfactual
analysis with demand and supply-side estimates.
3.2 Consumer Demand
3.2.1 Demand Model
Following the existing literature, I assume a consumer derives utility from
some characteristics of a product and that this utility is also influenced by region-
specific and time-specific factors and individual-specific preferences. The indirect
utility that consumer i receives from purchasing product j in market r at time t is
given by:
uijrt = αipjrt + βixjrt +
K∑
k=1
gk(yjrtk,θik) + ξjrt + εijrt, (3.1)
where pjrt is the observed retail price in market r at time t, xjrt contains the observ-
able product characteristics that are assumed to be exogenous and a set of region
and time fixed effects, yjrtk denotes the k-th endogenous characteristic of product
j in market r at time t. ξjrt is the unobserved product characteristics or quality
valuations specific to market r t, and εijrt is a consumer specific stochastic term.
This model specification supplements BLP and echoes Fan (2013) by considering
endogenous product characteristics. In particular, I allow the consumer’s utility
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from each endogenous characteristic to be a flexible function of that characteristic.
For example, the consumer i’s utility from the k-th endogenous characteristics yjk








or a simple linear function
gk(yjk, θik) = θikyjk. (3.3)
Consumers’ heterogeneous preferences are captured by consumer-specific parame-
ters αi, βi, and θik, where αi is a scalar, and βi and θik are vectors. Similar to
Nevo (2000), I assume these consumer taste-specific parameters depend on both
consumer demographics Di and unobservable consumer characteristics vi, and they










+ ΠDi + Σvi, Di ∼ PD(D), vi ∼ Pv(v), (3.4)
where Di is a d×1 vector of demographics that follow the distribution PD. Suppose
K1 is the dimension of observed exogenous characteristics vector, K2 is the dimension
of vector θ̄, then vi is a (K1 +K2 + 1)× 1 vector which is normally distributed with
distribution Pv. Π is a (K1+K2+1)×dmatrix of coefficients that measure how tastes
vary with consumer demographics, and Σ is a (K1 +K2 + 1)× (K1 +K2 + 1) matrix
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of parameters whose off-diagonal elements are zeros. This parametric specification
allows individual’s taste or valuation for price and product characteristics to be
varying across consumers.
The indirect utility function in equation (3.1) can be decomposed into a con-
stant part δjrt(pjrt,xjrt,yjrt, ξjrt; ᾱ, β̄, θ̄), plus a random part µijrt(pjrt,xjrt,yjrt,Di,vi; Π,Σ)
such that
uijrt = δjrt + µijrt + εijrt, (3.5)
where δjrt is a function of product characteristics given linear parameters
δjrt = ᾱpjrt + β̄xjrt +
K∑
k=1
gk(yjrtk, θ̄k) + ξjrt, (3.6)
and represents the mean utility of purchasing product j in market r at time t
across all consumers. µijrt is a function of consumer characteristics given nonlinear
parameters
µijrt = [pjrt,xjrt,yjrt]
′ ∗ (ΠDi + Σvi), (3.7)
which denotes the consumer-specific deviations from the mean.
It is very likely that consumers may prefer products which are not included in
the given product choice set. Most of the existing literature normalizes consumer’s
utility from the outside option to be fixed (e.g. normalize to zero). By assuming
that consumers choose the product that gives them the highest utility, the market
share of product j in market r at time t can be calculated analytically or numerically
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according to the distributional assumptions on D, v, and ε
Sjrt(pjrt,xjrt,yjrt; ᾱ, β̄, θ̄,Π,Σ) =
∫
dPε(ε)dPD(D)dPv(v). (3.8)
In particular, if we assume the idiosyncratic error terms ε are iid draws from the
Type I extreme value distribution, and normalize the utility from outside good
to zero, the market share of product j in market r at time t can be calculated
analytically with the following formula





c=1 exp(δkrt + µikrt)
dPD(D)dPv(v),
(3.9)
where J denotes the number of products available in the choice set.
3.2.2 Demand Estimation
For the random coefficient logit demand model with only endogenous price,
BLP develops a algorithm to estimate parameters via the generalized method of
moments (GMM). Following the same spirit of BLP algorithm, the demand model
with endogenous price and product characteristics can be estimated with appro-
priate instrumental variables for corresponding product characteristics. Assume
Z = [Z1, Z2, ..., ZL] is a set of instruments for endogenous price and product char-
acteristics, parameters Γ = [ᾱ, β̄, θ̄,Π,Σ] can be estimated using the following
moment conditions
E[ZlG(Γ
∗)] = 0, l = 1, ..., L (3.10)
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where G denotes the structural errors or residuals and Γ∗ is the set of true param-
eters. Parameter estimates can be found such that







where W is the weighting matrix which can be calculated from the first stage esti-
mates whose weighting matrix is an identity matrix. To calculate structural error
G, I assume the observed market share of product j in market r at time t equals to
its expression in equation (3.9)
Sjrt = sjrt(δjrt; Π,Σ). (3.12)
In particular, the mean utility δjrt can be solved numerically by inverting market





jrt + lnSjrt − ln ˆsjrt(δ
(h)
jrt ; Π,Σ), (3.13)
where h denotes the fixed-point iteration index, ˆsjrt is the predicted market share
given δ
(h)
jrt and a guess of nonlinear parameters. The mean utility δjrt is found as
long as equation (3.13) holds under acceptable tolerance. Once δjrt is computed,
the structural error term G can be expressed as





and the linear parameters [ᾱ, β̄, θ̄] can be estimated with appropriate instruments
by GMM in equation (3.10). In practice, the linear and nonlinear parameters are
estimated simultaneously by the following steps:
(1) Give a initial guess for nonlinear parameters [Π0,Σ0] and solve for the
mean utility δjrt.
(2) Solve linear parameters [ᾱ, β̄, θ̄] given δjrt and [Π0,Σ0] from step 1, by
using an instrumental variable approach.
(3) Repeat steps 1 and 2 such that the objective function in equation (3.11)
is satisfied.
With demand side estimates, the partial derivatives of market share with re-




























Here i indexes individual draws and yjrtk represents the k-th endogenous product
characteristics of product j in market r at time t. Price elasticities between product
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3.2.3 Identification and Instruments
Since prices and some product characteristics are potentially endogenous, ap-
propriate instrumental variables are needed to help reduce estimation bias. Tradi-
tional instrumental variables of the BLP model fall into 3 types. The first type of
instruments are the BLP instruments proposed by Berry (1994) and BLP. BLP type
instruments are measures of isolation in product space which include the summation
of (i) product characteristics of other products by the same manufacturer in the same
market, and (ii) product characteristics of other products produced by other manu-
facturers in the same market. The advantages of the BLP type instruments are that
they are normally available in the data and tend to be highly correlated with prices.
However, the are several weaknesses associated with the BLP type instruments as
well. First, they have limited variations over time. For example, product character-
istics of automobiles are fixed in a relative long time period. Second, they assume
the unobservable product attributes are uncorrelated with observed attributes.
The second type of instruments are Hausman type, which use prices in other
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markets as a proxy for cost shifters (e.g. Hausman (1996); Nevo (2000)). The intu-
ition behind the Hausman type instrument is that prices in other markets may share
common cost shocks. For example, if the manufacturer faces a cost increase, it will
increase corresponding prices in all markets. However, Hausman type instruments
are invalid if products in other markets are facing common demand shocks.
The third type of instruments include data from the cost side, or observed cost
shifters that may affect supply. For example, Berry et al. (1999) use cost shifters such
as wage and exchange rates to approximate marginal cost of automobile production.
More and more, the empirical literature has recognized the importance of combining
several types of instruments to reduce estimation bias. For example, the importance
of having both BLP type and cost shifter type instruments has been supported by
Reynaert and Verboven (2014) with simulations, and Berry and Haile (2015) explain
that both types of instruments are essential, especially without additional data or
model structure.
In the traditional BLP model, firms only consider pricing decisions and all
product characteristics are assumed to be exogenous. In my conceptual model, in
additional to pricing decisions, firms also strategically choose certain product charac-
teristics periodically, thus these product characteristics are considered endogenous.
With endogenous product characteristics, one possible instrument choice shares the
same spirit as that in BLP, which uses the attributes of competing products as
instruments. For example, focusing on the newspaper industry, Fan (2013) uses
the demographics in the non-overlapping markets of a newspaper’s competitors to
instrument three endogenous newspaper characteristics. The second plausible in-
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strument choice follows the same logic of Hausman type instrument, by using the
product characteristics of the same product in other market as instruments.
3.3 Supply
In this section, I develop a framework for the vertical structure between man-
ufacturers and retailers where manufacturers face both price and non-price com-
petitions. This framework builds on Villas-Boas (2007)’s setting and extends to
non-price competition. The stylized model can be applied to any consumer good
industry which incorporates both upstream firms and downstream retailers. Follow-
ing the existing literature, I assume the supply side model yields two stages. In the
first stage, upstream firms choose prices and product attributes in each market. In
the second stage, given upstream firms’ choices, downstream retailers choose corre-
sponding retail prices in each market. By observing consumer demand, downstream
retailers and upstream firms solve optimal choices by maximizing their profits re-
spectively.
3.3.1 Retailer Pricing Decisions
The vertical structure between manufacturers and retailers makes the two-
stage game complicated since two parties are both involved in choices of multiple
dimensions. Villas-Boas (2007) argued that vertical relationships are especially hard
to estimate due to infra-marginal components, transaction costs, and imperfect in-
formation issues. However, for most fast-moving consumer goods, the nature of
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direct-to-store delivery simplifies the game significantly. With direct-to-store distrib-
utors, downstream retailers are not responsible for shipping, stocking, and managing
inventories. Instead, these costs are transferred to the upstream firms. Ellickson
et al. (2017) made a similar assumption by assuming downstream retailers face no
marginal costs in the ready-to-drink coffee industry.
Let’s first suppose a monopolist retailer R sells differentiated products for







jr − pWjr )Sjr, (3.18)
where Gr is the set of products available in market r, Mr is the market size of
market r, Sjr denotes the market share for product j in retailer R, p
R
jr is the retail
price of product j set by retailer R in market r, and pWjr denotes the wholesale price
set by corresponding manufacturers. Due to the nature of direct-to-store delivery
in fast-consuming good industries, the marginal cost of retailing largely transfers to
the manufacturer side and thus can be simplified to zero. Maximizing the retailer’s
profit function by taking first order derivative with respect to product j’s retail price








Following Villas-Boas (2007), define ΩRr as retailer R’s response matrix, which
contains the first order derivatives of market shares with respect to all retail prices
42
in market r. Stacking the first order conditions above and rearranging them yields




r − pWr = −ΩRr (pr)−1Sr, (3.20)
where mR,monopolyrt is the markup of monopolist retailer R in market r.
1 With
demand-side estimates, the retailer’s response matrix ΩRr can be calculated nu-
merically, thus the retailer’s marginal cost (wholesale price) can be calculated to-
gether with observed market shares and retail prices under the monopoly pricing
assumption according to equation (3.20). In reality, the monopolist retailer assump-
tion rarely holds for consumer products and the representative retailer doesn’t have
much monopoly power over differentiated products except its own brand. To relax
the monopolist retailer assumption and capture the degree of competition among
downstream retailers, I follow Miller and Weinberg (2017)’s approach by adjusting
the monopolist retailer’s markup with a retail scaling parameter. This retail scaling
parameter reflects the average degree of competition among retailers in the indus-
try. For a high degree of competition among retailers, the retail scaling parameter
would be close to zero, suggesting low profit margins for retailers. However, for
a low degree of competition, such as monopolist or oligopolist retailers, the retail
scaling parameter would be close to one which suggests high profit margins for re-
tailers. Given any competition structure, the retailer R’s pricing equation can be
1Vectors and matrices are denoted as bold symbols in the remaining of this chapter.
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where λ is a retail scaling parameter vector with each element λj ∈ [0, 1]. Replacing
equation (3.20) in equation (3.21) yields
pRr = p
W
r − λΩRr (pr)−1Sr. (3.22)
If λj = 1, the representative retailer plays as a monopolist and has full
monopoly power over product j; if λj = 0, the representative retailer competes
in a perfect competitive market and uses marginal cost pricing with product j; If
0 < λj < 1, the retailer as intermediate levels of market power over product j, which
is more realistic for consumer products. In empirical research, the parameter vector
λ can be either treated as a known parameter vector based on appropriate assump-
tions of retailer competition, or taken as an unknown parameter vector which needs
to be estimated.
3.3.2 Manufacturer Decisions
In modling choices of the upstream firms, most of the existing literature focuses
exclusively on pricing decisions. For example, Villas-Boas (2007) assumes upstream
manufacturers are oligopolists playing Nash-Bertrand games in the wholesale mar-
ket. Fan (2013) extends the Nash-Bertrand competition model by allowing firms
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to choose some product attributes endogenously. My supply side framework builds
on Fan (2013)’s model and incorporates the vertical structure between upstream
manufacturers and downstream retailers.
In the first stage of game, each upstream manufacturer simultaneously chooses
wholesale prices and corresponding product attributes for their products in each
market, with full information about how these choices change the optimal behaviors
of rival manufacturers and the downstream retailers. The two-stage game can be




r − λΩRr (pr)−1Sr(pRr ,yr), (3.23)
which implicitly defines retailer R’s equilibrium prices pR∗(pWr ,yr) given manu-
facturers’ choices of wholesale price pWr and endogenous product attributes yr in




Equation (3.24) suggests that endogenous product attributes yr affect market shares
both directly through consumer utility and indirectly through retailer’s best re-
sponses. Wholesale prices affect market shares indirectly via retailer’s best re-
sponses.
Suppose a upstream consumer good manufacturer m offers a bundle of differ-
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entiated products Grm, which contains Nm products in a market r to a monopolist
retailer in a given time period. Similar to Fan (2013)’s setting, I assume the manu-












where the first term denotes variable profit and the second term denotes fixed cost
of choosing endogenous product attributes. Specifically, Fjkr(.) measures manufac-
turer’s fixed cost of choosing endogenous attribute k for product j in market r, which
is a function of corresponding product attributes yjkr, such as product quality, va-
riety, and advertising intensity. This functional form of Fjkr(.) can either be linear
or quadratic depending on the nature of attributes. For example, Sullivan (2016)
defines the fixed cost that a ice cream manufacturer has to pay to the retailer as
a linear function of the number of flavors that manufacturer offers in that market.
Murry (2017) assumes the fixed cost of an automobile manufacturer’s advertisement
is a quadratic function of the advertising intensity in each market. Fan (2013) also
makes quadratic functionoal form assumptions on the fixed cost of choosing a cer-
tain combination of newspaper attributes. Following Fan (2013), I assume the slope
of the fixed cost function Fjkr(yjkr) with respect to the k-th endogenous product
attribute yjkr is




where νfjkr is unobservable, Θjk denotes the parameter of product j for the k-th
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attribute.2 Equation (3.26) implicitly determines the quadratic functional form
for the fixed cost function of offering each product attribute. cWjr represents the
marginal costs of production, shipping and distribution of product j to market r.
The existing literature often approximates marginal cost using input prices, local
wage rates, distances, and product characteristics, and parameterizes it as a linear
function of these factors (e.g. Petrin (2002); Villas-Boas (2007); Miller and Weinberg
(2017)). Following the existing literature, I parameterize manufacturer’s marginal
cost as a linear function of the observed cost components
cwjr = ηWjr + ωjrt, (3.27)
where η is the vector of cost parameters, Wjr represents the observed cost component
which may include input prices, transportation distances, and dummy variables for
product j and market r. ωjr is unobservable cost shifter.
The manufacturer’s profit can be derived as a function of its own strategic












Given the manufacturer’s profit function in equation (3.28), and knowing that the
retailer behaves according to equation (3.23), the manufacturer’s optimal pricing
and endogenous attributes choices can be found by taking the first order derivatives
2My fixed cost function differs from Fan (2013)’s specification by omitting the intercept term
in the slope and assuming fixed cost is proportional to the market size.
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with respect to pWjr and yjkr respectively for each product j and attribute k. Suppose
each product has the number of K endogenous product attributes and there are J
products available in market r at a given time period, by assuming a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, the J first order conditions for manufacturers’ price competition
are ∑
c∈Gr
[pWcr − cWcr ]
∂S∗cr
∂pWjr
+ Sjr = 0, (3.29)

















j2r ∀j ∈ Gr
...∑
c∈Gr







Where S∗cr = S
∗
cr(p
R∗(pWr ,yr),yr) represents the market share of product c in market
r which is a function of wholesale prices pWr and endogenous product attributes yr.
3.3.3 Vertical Structure and Pass-through
The supply side model considers the vertical structure between upstream man-
ufacturers and downstream retailers, and each manufacturer anticipates how changes
in wholesale prices and corresponding endogenous product attributes would affect
retail price and therefore change consumer demand. For example, a change in whole-
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sale price of one product will directly affect retail prices of all products and further
influence their shares in a given market and time period. Thus the effect of the






























] is product j’s wholesale price pass-though to retail
prices. This formula suggests that a change in product j’s wholesale price affects
product c’s demand indirectly through the impact on the equilibrium retail prices
for all products in the game. Similarly, considering retail pass-through, the impact
of non-price competition in the k-th endogenous product attribute of product j on



















is the pass-through of the k-th endogenous product attribute of product
j to product i’s retail price. The first term on the left-hand side is the direct
impact of increasing or decreasing the k-th attribute of product j on the demand of
product c in the same market. Additionally, a change in yjk has a indirect effect on
the demand of product c through an impact on the equilibrium retail prices for all
products in the game, which is captured by the second term of equation (3.32). The
difficulties of the vertical structure lie in computing or recovering the pass-through
of manufacturers’ choices to retail prices.
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To recover the pass-through of wholesale price to retail price, Sudhir (2001),
Villas-Boas (2007), and Miller and Weinberg (2017) apply the implicit function theo-
rem to the retail pricing first order conditions. More recently, Murry (2017) extends
the implicit function theorem to recover the pass-through of wholesale price to re-
tailer advertising. Similar to Sudhir (2001), Villas-Boas (2007), Miller and Weinberg




by applying the implicit function theorem, and also extend this approach




for k = 1, ..., K.
To compute the pass-through with the implicit function theorem, let’s first
rewrite the retailer first-order conditions in equation (3.19) as follows:
Q(j) = Sjr +
∑
c∈Gr




where Q contains J equations of retailer r’s optimal pricing for each product, and
Q(j) denotes the j-th first-order condition of retailer r’s pricing. I simplify the
notation by dropping the retailer subscript r. With this system of equations, I define







, andQky(c, j) =
∂Q(j)
∂yck
, for k = 1, ..., K. Define the matrix ∆pw as the




Similarly, for the k-th endogenous product attribute, its product attribute to retail








According to the implicit function theorem, the matrix of wholesale to retail
price pass-through ∆pw is the solution to the following system of equations:
Qp∆
p
w = Qw, (3.34)




Following the same approach, the matrix of the k-th endogenous product attribute






for k = 1, ..., K. Expressions for matrices Qp and Q
k
y are very complicated which














where } denotes the multiplication of 3-dimension to 2-dimension matrices.3 The
first term ∂S
∂pR
is ΩR defined in equation (3.20). Let’s define the second order deriva-
tives of market shares with respect to all retail prices ∂
2S
∂pR∂pRT
, as ∆sspp, a 3-dimension
3In this chapter, } denotes the following rule of matrix multiplication: for a 3-dimension matrix
A (J by J by J) and a 2-dimension matrix B (J by 1), A } B = C, where C is a 2-dimension
matrix (J by J) with general element C(c, j) = A(c, :, j)B.
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. Replacing retailer’s equilibrium
markup (pR−pW ) with −λΩR−1S, and treating retail scaling parameters the same
across all products, Qp can be expressed in the matrix notation as follows
Qp = Ω













} (pR − pW ), (3.39)
for k = 1, ..., K. Define Ωyk as manufacturer’s response matrix in terms of the k-th
endogenous product attribute with general elements Ωyk(c, j) =
∂Sj
∂yck
, and ∆sspyk as
a 3-dimension matrix of second order derivatives of market shares with respect to
retail prices and the k-th endogenous product attribute, whose general elements are
∆sspyk(c, j, h) =
∂2Sh
∂pRj ∂yck
. In matrix notation, Qky is defined as
Qky = Ω
yk − λ∆sspyk } Ω
R−1S. (3.40)
At last, knowing Qw = −ΩR
T
, and expressions of Qp and Q
k
y, pass-through
matrices ∆pw and ∆
p
yk
can be computed accordingly with pre-calculated response
matrices ΩR, Ωyk , ∆sspp, and ∆
ss
pyk
, and retail scaling parameter λ. 4
4The retail scaling parameter λ can be treated as a known or unknown parameter. For example,
one can make a monopolist retailer assumption by setting λ = 1, or assume a high degree of retail
competition by setting λ to small numbers less than 1. My model setting also allows for a flexible
degree of price competition among retailers when λ is treated as a unknown parameter which needs
to be estimated empirically with appropriate instrumental variables.
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3.3.4 Supply Estimation
Given manufacturers’ first order conditions for pricing in equation (3.29), I
can simply recover manufacturers’ price-cost margins as
pW − cW = −(T ∗∆sw(λ))−1S, (3.41)
where T is a J by J matrix which describes manufacturers’ ownership for J products
in a given market and time period. Specifically, T (c, j) = 1 if products c and j are
produced by the same manufacturer, T (c, j) = 0, otherwise. The symbol ‘∗’ repre-
sents element by element matrix multiplication. ∆sw(λ) denotes the manufacturer’s
response matrix of wholesale price to market share which depends on the retail








With matrix notation, the J × K first order conditions for manufacturers’
non-price competitions listed in equation (3.30) are
(T ∗∆syk(λ))(p
W − cW ) = Θkyk + ν
f
k , k = 1, ..., K,
(3.42)
where ∆syk(λ) is the manufacturer’s response matrix of the k-th endogenous product
attribute to market share which depends on retail scaling parameter λ. The general
elements of this matrix are ∆syk(λ)(c, j) =
∂S∗j
∂yck




(λ)ΩR. Replacing the manufacturer price-cost margins on the left-hand side of
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−1S] = Θkyk + ν
f
k , k = 1, ..., K,
(3.43)
which involve both linear parameter vectors Θk, and a scalar nonlinear parameter
λ. To estimate the marginal cost parameter vector η, I add the retailer’s pricing
equation (3.22) to manufacturer’s pricing equation (3.41), and replace marginal cost
with its parameterized form in equation (3.27). This procedure yields the supply-
side estimation equation for marginal cost parameters:
pR = −(T ∗∆sw(λ))−1S − λΩR
−1
S + ηW + ω. (3.44)
Systems of equations of (3.43) and (3.44) together form the supply-side estimation
equations for the set of parameter ΓS = [λ,η,Θ1, ...,ΘK ], where λ is nonlinear
parameter scalar and η,Θ1, ...,ΘK are linear parameter vectors.
Similar to demand-side estimation, the supply-side parameter ΓS is estimated
by GMM with appropriate instrumental variables for endogenous product attributes
yk and the retail scaling parameter λ. The set of instruments for yk in supply
estimation can be the same as what is used in demand estimation. Additional
instruments are required if the retail scaling parameter λ is to be estimated, which
is due to the fact that unobserved costs ω may affect retail markups (Miller and
Weinberg (2017)). Instruments for λ may include demand variables and variables
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that affect retail competition but not retail costs.
Assume ZS = [ZS1 , Z
S
2 , ..., Z
S
I ] is a set of instruments for retail scaling param-





)] = 0, i = 1, ..., I (3.45)
where GS denotes the structural errors or residuals and ΓS
∗
is the set of true pa-
rameters. The GMM parameter estimates are obtained when the objective function
is minimized:









W S is the weighting matrix for supply estimation. Given a guess for λ, the structural






GS1k = −[T ∗∆syk(λ)][(T ∗∆
s
w(λ))
−1S]−Θkyk, k = 1, ..., K (3.47)
and
GS2 = p
R + (T ∗∆sw(λ))−1S + λΩR
−1
S − ηW. (3.48)




mand estimates Γ̂, supply-side parameter ΓS can be estimated by GMM as defined
in equation (3.46). If the retail scaling parameter λ is given, we can use a simple
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instrumental variable approach to estimate linear parameters. Otherwise, the linear
and nonlinear parameters are estimated as follows:
(1) Given demand-side estimates, pre-compute response matrices ΩR, ∆sspp,
Ωyk , and ∆sspyk , for k = 1, ..., K.
(2) Give a initial guess for nonlinear parameter λ0, compute ∆
s
w(λ0) and
∆syk(λ0), for k = 1, ..., K.
(3) Estimate linear parameters η0,Θ10, ...,ΘK0 by using instrumental variable
approach, then compute structural errors GS(ΓS0 ).
(4) Repeat step 2 and 3 until the objective function defined in (3.46) is mini-
mized.
3.4 Counterfactual Analysis
One important advantage of the structural model is it allows researchers to do
counterfactual simulations of policy changes, collusions, and mergers. Considering
the case of a proposed horizontal merger of manufacturer A and manufacturer B,
researchers have both demand and supply-side estimates [Γ̂pre, Γ̂
S
pre] based on the
data in the pre-merger period and can use this to predict the equilibrium market
outcomes and consumer welfares if the merger happens with efficiencies. In this case,




post if the merger occurs
with synergies or efficiencies, the counterfactual equilibrium market outcomes can
be predicted by solving the structural demand and supply models derived above
with parameters [Γ̂pre, Γ̂
S
post] and ownership matrix T post. To be more specific, one
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can do the following steps to calculate the counterfactual market outcomes:
(1) With pre-merger demand and supply-side estimates [Γ̂pre, Γ̂
S
pre], recover
demand-side unobservables ξ̂ and ε̂, and supply-side unobservables ω̂ and v̂f .
(2) Given a initial guess for manufacturers’ choices for wholesale prices pW0 and
endogenous product attributes y0, solve for retailer’s optimal retail prices p
R
0 with
given parameters Γ̂pre and demand-side unobservables [ξ̂, ε̂] according to equation
(3.22).
(3) Based on pW0 , y0, p
R
0 , Γ̂pre and demand-side unobservables [ξ̂, ε̂], re-
compute response matrices ΩR, ∆sspp, Ω





, for k = 1, ..., K.
(4) Compute the right-hand side of equations (3.43) and (3.44), and left-hand
side of equation (3.43) based on T post, supply-side unobservables [ω̂, v̂f ], and re-
sponse matrices computed in step 3.
(5) Repeat steps 2 to 4 until the equations in (3.43) and (3.44) hold under
reasonable tolerances.
By following the steps above, one can find the counterfactual equilibrium mar-
ket outcomes post-merger [p̂Wpost, ŷpost] and conduct analyses by comparing them with
observed pre-merger counterparts.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
I develop a conceptual framework which incorporates vertical relationships
between upstream firms and downstream retailers to estimate demand and supply
when considering both price and non-price competition. In addition to the classic
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price competition game, my framework allows firms to compete in endogenous prod-
uct attributes. My demand-side model builds on BLP (1995) and Fan (2013) which
allows for endogenous prices and product attributes and consumer heterogeneity.
The supply-side model can be applied to industries with differentiated products and
vertical relationships between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers,
where manufacturers simultaneously choose wholesale prices and endogenous prod-
uct attributes in the first stage, retailers choose retail prices in the second stage given
manufacturers’ optimal behaviors. My model also relaxes the monopolist retailer
assumption (e.g. Ellickson et al. (2017)) by incorporating a retail scaling param-
eter to flexibly capture the degree of competition among retailers. In this paper,
I provide detailed identification and estimation strategies, and ways to implement
counterfactual simulations when conducting policy analyses, such as merger and tax
simulations. Considering the model application, researchers can apply it to a wide
range of industries that have vertical relations with downstream retailers and non-
price competition among their differentiated products. Fast moving consumer goods
such as beverages, milk, ice cream, and yogurt may fall in this category. For the ice
cream industry, Sullivan (2016) provides evidence that premium ice cream manu-
facturers collude not only in price but also in product space, e.g. choice of flavors.
Future studies may apply the framework developed in this paper to understand re-
search questions in relevant industries, such as how price and non-price competitions
affect the equilibrium market outcomes, channel profits between manufacturers and
retailers, and merger analysis.
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Chapter 4: What Makes A Good Merger? An Analysis of Merger
Efficiencies in the U.S. Bottled Water Industry
4.1 Introduction
Horizontal mergers are prevalent economic activities in the modern economy,
which may have significant effects on the market structure, competition, and con-
sumer welfares. Most existing empirical studies in horizontal merger find exclusively
“bad” effects of merger via market power increase (e.g. Kim and Singal (1993); Nevo
(2001); Capps et al. (2003)), and little work has been done examining the effects
of horizontal merger on synergies or efficiencies (Whinston (2003)). In addition,
it is unclear how important the underlying merger efficiencies are in affecting the
equilibrium market outcomes.
Another gap of knowledge lies in the non-price dimensions of competition
in horizontal merger analysis. The 2010 Merger Guidelines of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) places more weights on non-price considerations in
Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts
Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The
conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect the views
of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and
preparing the results reported herein.
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merger analysis, and recent enforcement actions reveal an increased focus on non-
price effects of merger (Gundlach and Moss (2018)), yet most empirical research
relies solely on price effects by assuming Nash-Bertrand pricing equilibria when
conducting merger analyses. Non-price effects are critically important in antitrust
analysis because price may not be the key strategic variable in all industries, and the
effect of a merger on these non-price dimensions of competition do not necessarily
correspond to their price effects (Kwoka and Kilpatrick (2018)).
In this paper, I explore the economic effects of Coca-Cola’s acquisition of
Glaceau, a major enhanced water manufacturer in the U.S. bottled water market.
In May 2007, Coca-Cola announced its proposed acquisition of Glaceau for $4.2
billions, which was quickly approved by the U.S. regulators one month later. After
the merger, I find that compared to other enhanced water brands, the market shares
of Glaceau brands (Vitaminwater and Smartwater) increased significantly in many
U.S. regions, while price trends were similar to other flavored brands post-merger.
In addition, I find that the product varieties (measured in number of UPCs) and
per-capita advertising expenditures of Glaceau increased significantly in the post-
merger period. Classic models that incorporate only price effects cannot rationalize
the observed changes in varieties and advertising post-merger. The dramatic changes
in product varieties and advertising of Glaceau after the merger explicitly suggest
that the merger affects Glaceau’s choices for variety and advertising through not
only efficiency changes but also non-price competition.
To quantify the market power and efficiencies from the merger, I estimate
a structural model of demand and supply that incorporates both price and non-
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price competitions, and I allows for post-merger efficiency changes for Glaceau in
marginal cost, product variety fixed cost, and advertising fixed cost. I focus on
premium bottled water products. In addition to the standard Nash-Bertrand pric-
ing competition, I assume manufacturers strategically choose product varieties and
advertising in each market. For the demand side, sharing the same spirit with Fan
(2013) and Murry (2017), I use a discrete choice random coefficient model that incor-
porates endogenous price and product characteristics for the estimation of consumer
substitution patterns. In particular, I assume product variety and advertising affect
consumer purchase decisions. My demand estimates imply small substitution effects
between bottled water products within the choice set, consistent with the findings
of Bonnet and Dubois (2010). Moreover, consumers are more likely to switch to
cheaper outside choices rather than substituting between premium water products
when facing a price increase, suggesting that premium water products are highly dif-
ferentiated and the share increase of Glaceau post-merger mostly came from outside
products rather other premium products.
The supply side of the model involves choices of varieties and advertising by
manufacturers, and prices by manufacturers and retailers. I assume that in each
market manufacturers choose wholesale prices, product varieties, and advertising in
the first stage, and a monopolist retailer chooses corresponding retail prices in the
second stage. Due to the direct store delivery (DSD) business approach of bottled
water products, the retailer part of the supply model can be heavily simplified by
transferring all shipping, inventory, and stock management costs to manufacturers.
Thus I assume there is no marginal cost or fixed cost associated with retailers.
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Since wholesale price data are unobservable, I use Villas-Boas (2007)’s approach to
recover wholesale prices from retailer’s optimal pricing given consumers’ substitution
patterns from the demand estimates. The same approach to recover wholesale prices
has been applied to a wide range of industries by Gayle (2013), Ellickson et al.
(2017), and Murry (2017). To rationalize the observed data of Glaceau and capture
possible merger efficiencies through marginal cost and fixed cost variations, the
supply model incorporates indicators for Glaceau products in post-merger periods
in corresponding marginal cost and fixed cost functions. For horizontal merger
efficiencies or synergies, most previous studies only focus on one type of efficiency
by assuming efficiency gains are the same for all merging parties after the merger.
However, Coca-Cola is significantly “larger” than Glaceau in terms of both total
revenues and sales, it is reasonable to believe that the merger efficiencies for Coca-
Cola are trivial, and I am comfortable to ignore efficiencies on Coca-Cola bottled
water products (Dasani) post-merger.
The model suggests the merger generated efficiencies for Glaceau in all three
aspects by reducing the corresponding cost parameters post-merger. Specifically, I
estimate that the merger reduced Glaceau average marginal cost by 8.36 cents per
liter controlling for fixed effects, and the merger decreased Vitaminwater product va-
riety and advertising fixed cost parameters by about 20% and 80% respectively. The
results of implied merger efficiencies rationalize the observed increases in Glaceau
product variety and advertising post-merger.
To separately quantify the effects of different merger efficiencies on equilibrium
market outcomes, I conduct 5 counterfactual merger scenarios that impose different
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efficiency structures to the merging party. I compare observed prices, product vari-
eties, advertising, and market shares to the corresponding predictions from the dif-
ferent counterfactual merger scenarios. Product variety and advertising efficiencies
are found to play primary roles in affecting manufacturers’ equilibrium choices for
product variety and advertising respectively, while marginal cost efficiency is found
to play a dominant role in affecting equilibrium prices. In particular, the observed
post-merger retail prices of Glaceau in 2009 are 4.72%-6.98% lower than they would
have been under the “no merger” scenario, and product varieties, advertising, and
shares are 25.44%-44.52%, 144.06%-322.43%, and 40.1%-60.7% higher respectively.
These results suggest efficiencies that are created through merger have substantial
impacts on the “weaker” merging party’s market outcomes. I quantify net profits of
all competing brands and calculate welfare measures under different merger scenar-
ios and show that the merger increased the average net profit of competing brands
and consumer surplus by 0.68%-3.13% and 30.12% respectively, compared to the “no
merger” baseline in year 2009. These results imply limited market power effects on
prices, and justify regulators’ quick approval. More importantly, my results suggest
that, with efficiencies and non-price dimensions of competition, the merger which
appears to have had negative consequences may yield benefits.
This study relates to several strands of literature in both economics and mar-
keting. First, it relates to research concerning market power and price effects (e.g.
Kim and Singal (1993); Nevo (2001)). Kim and Singal (1993) show that compared
to other routes, merging airlines raised fares significantly on routes they serve. Nevo
(2001) proposes a framework to measure changes in market power post-merger, by
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calculating price-cost margins via robust demand estimates of the random coefficient
model. Second, it relates to literature about horizontal merger efficiencies. Though
the literature about the relationship between market power and merger efficiencies
can date back to at least 1960s (e.g. Williamson (1968)), limited empirical work
has done in this area. For instance, Williamson (1968) suggests a framework to
evaluate the tradeoff between the welfare effects of efficiency gains and prices in-
creases. Ashenfelter et al. (2015) examine the effects of increased concentration and
efficiencies on pricing, by focusing on the Miller-Coors joint venture in the U.S. beer
industry. Kulick (2017) estimates the price effects and cost efficiencies of horizontal
mergers in the ready-mix concrete industry. My study considers merger efficiencies
in multiple dimensions and incorporate non-price competition.
The third strand of related literature is about the non-price competition of dif-
ferentiated products. My study includes manufacturers’ strategic choices for product
varieties and adverting, and their corresponding impacts on consumer demand. In
terms of competition in product space, Sullivan (2016) develops a model to study
competition in the market for super-premium ice cream by allowing two parties to
collude in both price and product space. The results suggest that firms collude not
only in price but also in the choice of flavors they offer. My study shares some
similarities with Sullivan (2016) to the extent that the coordination/merger affects
both prices and product varieties. Considering competition in advertising, Murry
(2017) develops and estimates a model of pricing and advertising decisions of new
car manufacturers and local retailers. Similar to Murry (2017), my supply side
model involves manufacturers’ strategic advertising decisions which affect consumer
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demand. 1
Fourth, my study considers the vertical relationships between upstream manu-
facturers and downstream retailers. One pioneering work of this stream of literature
is Villas-Boas (2007), who develops a feasible model which incorporates retailer
pass-through to calculate manufacturers’ markups when wholesale prices are not
available. Gayle (2013) and Ellickson et al. (2017) extend the vertical framework to
the airline markets, and the coffee market respectively. My supply side framework
draws upon the literature on vertical structure between upstream and downstream
firms, and the double marginalization of manufacturers and retailers (e.g. Bonnet
and Dubois (2010)).
Finally, this paper relates to literature that examines post-merger effects.
These studies compare the changes to the predictions before and after merger, typ-
ically by assuming a Nash-Bertrand competition among firms. Nevo (2000) empiri-
cally models the post-merger effects of the ready-to-eat cereal industry by recovering
marginal costs and simulating post-merger price equilibria accordingly. For the U.S.
airline market, Ciliberto et al. (2016) explore the post-merger effects between Amer-
ican Airlines and U.S. Air by allowing the market entry decisions to be endogenous,
and also assuming Nash-Bertrand competition pre and post-merger. A recent study
of Miller and Weinberg (2017) relaxes the unilateral effects of merger with consider-
ation of the potential post-merger coordination effects. I provide a novel approach
by accounting for both price and non-price competitions and by considering merger
efficiencies in several dimensions.
1Unlike Murry (2017), I am not modeling the retailer advertising decisions.
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The contribution of this study goes well beyond the application to the bottled
water industry. My comprehensive setting that involves both price and non-price ef-
fects, and allows for merger efficiencies in several aspects can be generalized to many
other industries and consumption goods that share similar features with premium
bottled water. With antitrust agencies’ increasing concerns for non-price effects in
merger, understanding and evaluating the harms and benefits of non-price aspects of
merger is a important policy and practical issue in the analysis of mergers. However,
as noted by Kwoka and Kilpatrick (2018), there remains a gap between the price
effects and non-price effects in terms of economic analytics and antitrust implica-
tions. In addition to contributions in merger efficiencies, my study contributes to
the literature on non-price effects by showing how merger efficiencies affect non-price
outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the U.S. bottled water industry, discusses datasets used in the analy-
sis, and describes market outcomes before and after the merger, with an emphasis on
the premium bottled water brands. Section 3 develops the demand model and dis-
cusses identification strategies and estimation results. Section 4 develops the supply
model and discusses relevant estimation results. Section 5 implements counterfac-
tual simulations under several merger scenarios and discusses the corresponding roles
that different merger efficiencies played in affecting equilibrium market outcomes.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
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4.2 Industrial Background
The U.S. bottled water industry is a typical consumer product industry which
incorporates the vertical relation between upstream manufacturers and downstream
retailers. Bottled water manufacturers compete in prices, product varieties, and
advertising intensity at local markets. As bottled water products belong to the fast-
moving consumer goods, they are normally distributed by the direct store delivery
(DSD) business approach, which means that manufacturers are responsible of dis-
tributing goods directly to the point of sale, and retailers carry no transportation
and related service costs. The U.S. bottled water sector is highly concentrated where
Nestle, Pepsi, Coca-Coca, and retailers’ own brands account for 80% of the total
market share in 2008. Bottled water products include purified water, spring water,
imported water, and flavored water, and are sold in different containers and package
sizes. In general, imported and flavored water brands are much more expensive than
other categories, and the unit price of “big pack” products are significantly lower
than single bottle counterparts.
4.2.1 Data
The primary data for this paper are drawn from the Nielsen Retailer Scanner
Data from period of January 2006 to December 2009. The data include weekly in-
formation of retail prices and quantities sold by UPC code for a sample of grocery
stores, convenience stores, drug stores, large merchandisers and liquor stores. I re-
strict the estimation samples to grocery stores within 92 distinct geographic regions
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and 10 top sale premium bottled water brands. 2 The Nielsen Company defines
a geographic region as the Designated Market Area (DMA), which includes one or
more metropolitan areas within a certain distance. In each DMA region, there are
several grocery store chains competing with each other. A representative local gro-
cery store chain normally operates a few hundred individual stores in each DMA
region or regions nearby. Some large chains operate in dozens of DMAs across the
nation. Pricing, stocking, and promotion decisions are made at the region-chain
level, so I define the market as a region-retailer pair. By aggregating region-store
level data to region-chain level data, the computational burden can be reduced sig-
nificantly. My final data contain 52 grocery store chains across 92 DMA regions,
which make up to 4,784 region-retailer pair markets (RRM).
I concentrate the samples on the Nielsen classification of “Water-Bottled”,
which excludes carbonated and energy drinks. Within this category, I observe var-
ious types of water with very different package sizes. The bottled water can be
further classified as pure water, spring water, enhanced water, and imported wa-
ter. Pure water is purified municipal water, e.g. Aquafina; spring water is water
transported from certain spring resources, e.g. Deer Park; enhanced water is pu-
rified municipal water with additional nutrition or flavor facts, e.g. Vitaminwater;
imported water is spring water which is imported from abroad, e.g. Fiji. Generally
speaking, imported water is the most expensive, and pure water is the cheapest.
Table 10 presents market shares of 14 flagship brands with top sales and popularity
nationwide according to retail scanner data. Retailers’ own brand is the highest and
2I exclude DMAs which contain only one grocery chain in the Nielsen sample.
68
accounts for one third of the total market share. Nestle accounts for about 31% of
market share, and Pepsi and Coca-Cola account for about 9% and 10% respectively.
Among manufacturers with top shares, Nestle concentrates on big-pack purified
and spring water products with much lower unit prices while Pepsi and Coca-Cola
have both flavored and non-flavored water brands. Except Crystal Geyser, brands
of other manufacturers are marketed as much more expensive “premium” brands
which cover imported and flavored water products.
Since bottled water is sold in different package sizes, it is natural to treat
the brand-size pair as the baseline unit of study. Unfortunately, the heterogeneous
package sizes across brands make this brand-size combination infeasible. Instead, I
categorize different package sizes into 2 groups, namely, single-pack and multi-pack.
With this simple classification, I am able to aggregate all UPC level data to brand-
package level data, which form my basic product unit of study. For each brand, I
define two “products”, e.g. single-pack Vitaminwater and multi-pack Vitaminwater.
The product variety is defined as the number of unique UPC codes that belong
to each “product” category in each market. For example, for the “product” of
single-pack Vitaminwater, it may include 8 unique UPC codes representing products
of different flavors and package sizes in a given market, in this case, the product
variety (number of UPCs) of single-pack Vitaminwater is defined as 8. I restrict my
choice set to 10 top sale premium bottled water brands and I further aggregate the
week-level data to month-level for estimation purpose.3 Thus the samples used for
3I find Dasani’s unit prices differ significantly across package and container sizes. For single
bottle products with container size less than 1 liter, the unit price of Dasani is almost 3 times higher
than products with larger container or multi-packs. Thus I exclude multi-pack and big-container
Dasani from the premium bottled water category. In the rest of this paper, “Dasani” means single
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consumer demand estimation consist of 146,107 observations at the region-chain-
product-month-year level, over the time period from 2006-2009.4 In additional to
the Nielsen Retailer Scanner Data, I use household demographics from the Nielsen
Household Panel to improve demand estimation. For each DMA region, I take 50
draws of household income, and allow these income draws to be correlated with the
price coefficient.
To understand manufacturers’ strategic decisions on advertising and to cap-
ture the effect of advertising on bottled water demand, I incorporate advertising
information in both demand and supply models. The advertising data come from
the Kantar TNS company, which collects information of firms’ advertising expendi-
tures on cable TV, radio, magazines, newspapers, and outdoor display. The TNS
advertising data contain monthly advertising expenditures for each brand at the na-
tional level, and regional specific advertising expenditures for more than 100 DMA
regions. I divide the monthly national advertising expenditure of each brand by the
total U.S. population to form the national level per-capita advertising expenditure
of each brand which measures the advertising intensity at the national level. For
regions with local advertising expenditures, I divide the monthly regional advertis-
ing expenditure of each brand by the total population of the corresponding region
to form the regional level per-capita advertising expenditure of each brand that
measures the advertising intensity at the regional level.
bottle Dasani products which belong to the premium water category based on unit price.
4Product and brand-package pair are used interchangeably.
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4.2.2 Price Effects of Coca-Cola and Glaceau Merger
I observe significant differences for Glaceau products in terms of market shares,
product varieties, and advertising before and after the merger with Coca-Cola. On
the national level, after merging with Cocoa-Cola, the market shares of Glaceau’s
flagship brands, Vitaminwater and Smartwater have almost doubled on average.
In addition, the product variety (number of UPCs) and per-capita advertising ex-
penditure of Vitaminwater are much larger in the post-merger period than before.
However, the average monthly prices of both brands seem to be fairly robust in the
pre and post-merger periods. To identify the mechanisms behind these economic
phenomena, I compare retail price, share, product variety, and advertising patterns
with those of other premium brands, which have similar national market shares.
Figure 6 and 7 present trends of average retail prices and market shares of 5
premium bottled water brands between January 2006 and December 2009 respec-
tively. The trends in the figures are calculated at the region-retailer level, which
measure the average changes in prices and shares in a representative regional re-
tailer. The vertical red long-dash line at July 2007 signifies the time when the
merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau is approved. The vertical blue line at February
2007 and red short-dash line at November 2007 respectively signify the time that 4
months before and after the merger was approved. The eight-month time window
between February 2007 and November 2007 roughly includes the time for pre-merger
negotiation, merger consummation, and realization of synergies or efficiencies post-
merger. Among these 5 premium water brands, Dasani and Fiji are non-flavored
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brands while Vitaminwater, Fruit2O, and Propel are flavored brands. Considering
prices, non-flavored brands Fiji and Dasani yield relative stable trends before and
after merger, and prices are quite flat along the time trend. Flavored brands Vi-
taminwater, Propel, and Fruit2O all yield consistent small downward time trends
which suggest prices of flavored water continue to decline with time. In addition,
prices of Vitaminwater fluctuate more than other brands.
Figure 7 shows the trends of average market shares of selected premium brands.
In the post-merger period, I observe a significant increase in Vitaminwater share
while market shares of non-flavored brands are relatively stable over time. One
may attribute the increase of Vitaminwater share to its corresponding price effects,
but for flavored brands, Fruit2O and Propel, which share similar downward time
trends in prices, their corresponding market shares don’t increase in the post-merger
periods. On the contrary, Fruit2O share reduces consistently in the post-merger
period. These findings suggest that the boost of Vitaminwater shares in the post-
merger period cannot be solely explained by price effects, other non-price factors
are likely to play roles in affecting competition as well. Besides, the decreasing
average prices and increasing average shares of the merging party are contradictory
to previous findings that the horizontal merger with Betrand competition tends to
increase market power, if the merger occurs without efficiencies.
At the regional (DMA) level, I find retail prices and market shares yield similar
time trends with what presented in figure 6 and figure 7 at the national level.
To illustrate the price and share trends at the regional level, I choose four large
DMA regions of Atlanta, Houston, San Francisco, and Philadelphia as examples.
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Figures 8-11 present the price trends of selected premium bottled water products
in these four DMA regions. I find the price trends of these four DMA regions are
very similar to the national level price trend that the price of flavored brands are
declining slightly over time. However, regional level trends have more variations
across time and regions. Figures 12-15 show the market share trends in these four
DMA regions. As expected, I find the regional level share trends also echo with the
national level share trend that Vitaminwater’s market share increases significantly
in the post-merger period.
4.2.3 Non-price Effects of the Merger
Figure 16 presents the trend of total number of UPCs of 5 premium bottled
water brands from January 2006 to December 2009. Similar to figure 7, the time
window between February 2007 and November 2007 approximates the period that
the merger is under negotiation, waiting for approval, and realization with syner-
gies. In the pre-merger period, especially before February 2007, Vitaminwater’s total
number of UPCs in the U.S. market is around 30. However, in the post-merger pe-
riod, Vitaminwater’s total number of UPCs is about 40 and relative stable between
November 2007 to January 2008. The trend of Propel is quite similar to that of
Vitaminwater and Propel increases its total number of UPCs in the post-merger pe-
riod, suggesting plausible competition in product varieties among these two brands.
For non-flavored brands, Fiji and Dasani, the trends in total number of UPCs don’t
change that much before and after the merger. In addition, figure 16 indicates that
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Fruit2O’s total number of UPCs declines consistently after the merger, which can
be explained by the cost savings of offering less varieties.
Figure 17 reveals the trend of average product varieties (number of UPCs)
sold in a local market (region-chain pair). For a representative local retailer, fla-
vored brands consistently have much higher product varieties than non-flavored
brands. That’s because flavored products offer flavor choices for the same container
and package size. On average, product varieties of non-flavored brands, Fiji and
Dasani, don’t vary much with time, but variations of flavored brands, Vitaminwater
and Propel, increase significantly in the post-merger period. Though there exists
an increasing trend in Vitaminwater varieties pre-merger, the post-merger average
values are much larger. In particular, the average product varieties that Propel
offers at a representative retailer increases abruptly in November 2007 after a quite
stable trend before the merger, suggesting Propel offers more varieties as a strategic
responses to its rivals’ non-price competition.
Referring to specific regions, figures 18-21 depict how average product varieties
change across time in Atlanta, Houston, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. Compar-
ing to the national average trend in figure 17, the regional trends of product variety
seem to be more heterogeneous. For example, for Atlanta and Houston regions, I ob-
serve abrupt increases in Vitaminwater’s number of UPCs around November 2007,
and for the Philadelphia region, I find Vitaminwater’s number of UPCs begins to
boost significantly at February 2007. In addition, similar to Propel’s national level
trend in product variety, I find Propel starts to offer a greater number of UPCs in
these four regions at November 2007. The time window between February 2007 and
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November 2007 coincides with the time when the Coca-Cola and Glaceau merger was
under negotiation, waiting for approval, and realized with synergies and efficiencies.
Figure 22 presents the trend of per-capita advertising expenditure of the same
premium bottled water brands discussed above. I find the advertising expenditure
is quite seasonal and that manufacturers tend to advertise in spring and summer.
Among these brands, Propel’s advertising expenditure is significantly higher than
other brands before July 2007. After the merger, especially after November 2007,
Vitaminwater advertises aggressively and its corresponding advertising expenditures
are much higher than its counterparts before the merger. The increasing trend of
Vitaminwater’s advertising after the merger coincides with its market share boots in
the post-merger period, thus I have reason to believe that Vitaminwater’s advertising
intensity contributed to its market share rise post-merger.
Trends in figures 16-22 imply that non-price effects of product variety and
advertising may affect demand positively. Moreover, price and non-price effects in-
terrelate with one another and simultaneously determine demand and market out-
comes. For example, more product variety and higher advertising would stimulate
consumer demand but also increase total costs which drives price up, the rise in price
inevitably reduces consumption along the demand curve. If the increased costs of
offering more varieties and advertising cannot be compensated by the gains from a
boost in demand, firms will not choose to do so. However, the increasing trends of
Vitaminwater’s product varieties, advertising, and shares suggest that the merger
generates efficiencies for Glaceau brands by lowering costs of varieties and advertis-
ing. The 2008 annual report of Coca-Cola Company states that “In 2007, the Com-
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pany transferred the majority of the distribution of Glaceau branded products to its
existing bottling system with the exception of certain regional Glaceau distributors
and certain channels.” 5 This statement provides evidence that Coca-Cola company
is in charge of the distribution of Glaceau branded products after the merger in
2007, suggesting merger efficiencies on Glaceau through a reduction in distribution
costs. The purpose of this paper is to explore how merger affects equilibrium market
outcomes through efficiencies by considering both price and non-price effects.
4.3 Consumer Demand
4.3.1 Demand Model
For the demand model, I use the standard random coefficient model devel-
oped by Berry et al. (1995), hereafter BLP. To capture the impacts of product
variety and advertising on demand, I include the number of UPCs for each product
(brand-package size) and the per-capita advertising expenditure of each brand in the
consumer utility function. 6 Suppose consumers i = 1, ..., Nrt purchase bottled wa-
ter in market r, where r denotes the region-retailer pair (market), over t = 1, ..., T
time periods. Each consumer can purchase one of the observed products among
the inside good set (j = 1, ..., J) or choose other products which are defined as
the outside good. The utility that consumer i receives from purchasing product j
5See Coca-Cola Company’s 2008 Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (page 48), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/
AnnualReportArchive/c/NYSE_KO_2008.pdf.
6The word of “product” and “brand-package size” means the same thing and is used inter-
changeably in the remaining paper.
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(brand-package) in market r at time t is given by:
uijrt = αipjrt + βiXjrt + f(N
upc
jrt , Dj; θ
d) + θaABjrt + ξjrt + εijrt (4.1)
where Xjrt contains the observable product characteristics and a set of region and
time fixed effects, pjrt is the observed retail price charged by region-retailer pair r in
time t. ξjrt is the unobserved product characteristics or quality valuations specific to
market r in period t, and εijrt is a consumer specific stochastic term. In addition to
many classic demand specifications (e.g. BLP; Nevo (2000); Nevo (2001); Ellickson
et al. (2017)), which use exogenous product characteristics as explanatory variables,
I include product variety (number of UPCs) Nupcjrt and per-capita advertising ABjrt
in the consumer indirect utility function. The utility that consumers gain from
product variety is defined as
f(Nupcjrt , Dj; θ
d) = θdf log(N
upc





where Dj is an indicator that equals to 1 if product j is flavored water. This
functional form allows marginal utility of product variety to be different for flavored
and non-flavored water products, and the logarithm of Nupcjrt ensures that product
variety increases utility at a decreasing rate given positive parameters θdf and θ
d
nf .
I assume advertising enters directly in the utility function defined above. In
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particular, the per-capita advertising ABjrt is defined as
ABjrt = ĀBt + ABrt, ∀j ∈ B, (4.3)
where ĀBt is the national level per-capita advertising expenditure of brand B at
time t, which is assumed to have the same effects across all markets. ABrt is the
corresponding DMA regional level per-capita advertising expenditure. Consistent
with Murry (2017)), I assume the brand advertising has the same effects on all
products of that brand in the same market.
The product characteristics included in Xjrt are hard to observe for bottled
water. Even though nutrition facts can be observed from the label of enhanced
water, many other products contain nothing but “water”, which suggests many
products share exactly the same attributes. To deal with this problem, I follow
Nevo (2000) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010) by using product fixed effects in-
stead of attributes to capture the time-invariant product characteristics. I spec-
ify the consumer-specific coefficient as [αi, βi] = [ᾱ, β̄] + ΠI
inc
i , where I
inc
i denotes
per-capita household income of consumer i, ᾱ and β̄ are the mean effects across
population. Noticing that the indirect utility function can be decomposed into
a constant part δjrt(pjrt, Xjrt, N
upc
jrt , Dj, ABjrt, ξjrt; ᾱ, β̄, θ
d, θa), plus a random part
µijrt(pjrt, Xjrt, I
inc
i ; Π) such that
uijrt = δjrt + µijrt + εijrt (4.4)
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where the first term, δjrt = ᾱpjrt+ β̄Xjrt+f(N
upc
jrt , Dj; θ
d)+θaABjrt+ξjrt represents
the mean utility of purchasing product j in market r at time t across all consumers,
the second term, µijrt denotes the consumer-specific deviations from the mean.
Following standard assumptions in the literature, I assume the mean utility
of purchasing the outside option is zero, and the idiosyncratic error terms εijrt are
iid draws from the Type I extreme value distribution. Under these assumptions, if
there are J products in the choice set, the market share of product j, in market r,






k=1 Ikrtexp(δkrt + µikrt)
dF (I inc) (4.5)
where Ikrt ia an indicator for whether product k is offered to market r in time t,
F (.) is a cumulative distribution function of consumer income.
Without the random part µijrt, the random coefficient logit model will reduce
to the logit model, which yields the following reduced-form specification:
log(Sjrt)− log(S0rt) = αpjrt + βXjrt + f(Nupcjrt , Dj; θd) + θaABjrt + ξjrt. (4.6)
Berry (1994) suggests a simple two stage least square (2SLS) method to estimate
the above model with appropriate instruments for the endogenous variables.
4.3.2 Demand Estimation
The demand model is estimated with the fixed point algorithm developed
by BLP via the generalized method of moments (GMM). Since retail prices are
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very likely to be correlated with unobserved product characteristics and demand
shocks, appropriate instrumental variables are needed to help reduce estimation
bias. Traditional instrumental variables of the BLP model fall into 3 types. The
first type of instruments are the BLP instruments proposed by BLP. BLP type
instruments include the summation of (i) product characteristics of other products
by the same manufacturer in the same market, and (ii) product characteristics of
other products produced by other manufacturers in the same market. The second
type of instruments are Hausman type, which use observed retailer prices in other
markets as a proxy for cost shifters (e.g. Nevo (2000)). The third type of instruments
include data from the cost side, or observed cost shifters that may affect supply. In
this study, I use instruments that share features of both Hausman type and cost
shifter type instruments. Specifically, for each given market (region-retailer pair)
at time period t, I use the retail prices in the 3 geographically nearest markets
in other states as instruments. Intuitively, these instruments are Hausman type
because they are prices in other markets. However, the markets I choose are close
to each other and in other states, which can be regarded as a proxy for cost shifters,
since the markets close to each other yield very similar production and shipping
costs. I avoid unobserved state effects by using the nearest markets which are out
of the local state. In addition to price, the number of UPCs and the market level
advertising are potentially endogenous as well, since manufacturers make strategic
decisions on product variety and advertising in each period. Following the same logic
of Hausman type instruments, in the same time period, I use the average number
of UPCs of the same retailer in other regions as instruments for product variety. In
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terms of market level advertising, I follow Murry (2017) by using the national level
advertising as instrument.
Table 11 presents partial results of demand estimation for logit and random
coefficient logit models. The logit model specification is estimated with the 2SLS by
instrumenting endogenous price, product variety, and advertising. For the random
coefficient model, I allow per-capita household income to affect preferences for price,
the constant, and package size (multi-pack dummy). In addition to the set of in-
struments discussed above, I use interaction terms as IVs by interacting the average
income across individuals with the mean price of 3 geographically nearest regions,
the constant, and package size to identify nonlinear parameters. Observations are
at the brand-package-region-month-year level and both regressions include prod-
uct, region, and time fixed effects. The mean price coefficient of logit and random
coefficient model are -2.095 and -2.439 respectively, suggesting downward sloping
demand functions under both specifications. 7 All other coefficients have expected
signs, and specifically, product variety and advertising affect demand positively un-
der both specifications. The mean own-price elasticities of both models are close in
magnitude but the random coefficient logit model yields more elastic demand.
Tables 12-13 show the mean own-price and cross-price elasticities across 16
products (brand-package pairs). On average, consumers are less price elastic to
relative cheaper products, such as Aquafina Splash and Fruit2O. For instance, a







where subscripts i,j, and r denote individual draw, product, and market. N and M represents
the number of draws of each market and the total number of markets in the estimation sample.
I also find all consumer-specific price coefficients αi are negative for all sample observations and
individual consumer draws.
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1% increase in the price of single-bottle Fiji will decrease its demand by roughly
4.1%. The findings that own-price elasticities tend to be higher for more expensive
products are consistent with Miller and Weinberg (2017), who look at the price
substitution patterns among beers. The cross-price elasticities are relative small in
magnitude, which are consistent with the findings of Bonnet and Dubois (2010),
who estimate bottled water demand in the French market.
To better understand the price competition between bottled water manufac-
turers, I also calculate the diversion ratio which measures the fraction of consumers
that substitute from one product to the other after a price increase. In a market
of Bertrand competition where manufacturers offer differentiated products, any two
products face lower diversion ratio if they are highly differentiated or substitutable,
which suggests a lower degree of price competition. Tables 14-15 present the diver-
sion ratios of inside goods and the outside good. Following Conlon and Mortimer
(2018), I define the diagonal elements as the diversion to the outside good rather
than -1. According to the definition, if all products are substitutes and consumers
make discrete choices, each row of the diversion matrix must sum to one. Each
row j in table 13 represents the diversion ratios of product j’s lost shares to differ-
ent products when product j increases price. For example, Aquafina single-bottle’s
diversion to the outside good and Dasani single-bottle are 96.56% and 0.30% re-
spectively, when Aquafina increases its price by 1%, suggesting consumers are more
likely to switch to cheaper products rather than substituting between premium wa-
ter products when facing a price increase. In general, I find the diversion ratios to
the outside good are very high for all inside goods, which reflects the cross-price
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elasticities reported in table 12 that premium bottled water products are highly
differentiated and less substitutable.
Tables 16 and 17 present the average advertising elasticities of 16 products
across all sample markets. For premium bottled water products, I find advertising
plays a small role in affecting demand, which is consistent with Zheng and Kaiser
(2008), who estimate the own-advertising elasticity of bottled water of 0.083. In ad-
dition to bottled water, Zheng and Kaiser (2008) estimate the advertising elasticities
of milk, juice, soft drinks, and coffee, and find they are similar to bottled water’s
advertising elasticity in terms of magnitude. My estimates for bottled water adver-
tising elasticity are similar to Zheng and Kaiser (2008) in terms of magnitude. For
example, consider the single-bottle Vitaminwater, its mean own-advertising elas-
ticity is 0.0516, which suggests a 1% increase in Vitaminwater’s advertising will
only increase its demand by about 0.05%. If the advertising elasticity is constant
along the demand curve, a 200% increase in Vitaminwater’s advertising may would
increase its demand by roughly 10%.
4.4 Supply
The supply model incorporates two stages. In the first stage, each manufac-
turer m chooses a subset of products Jrt to offer in market r at time t, the wholesale
price pwj and product variety N
upc
jrt for each brand-package pair j, and the per-capita
brand level advertising ABjrt.
8 I assume that each manufacturer makes decisions
simultaneously and repeatedly in each market and time period. In the second stage,
8I allow ABjrt to be zero but not negative.
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the retailer sets retail prices given manufacturers’ wholesale prices, product varieties,
and advertising. Consistent with related literature (e.g. Ellickson et al. (2017); Sul-
livan (2016)), I assume this game is played on a monthly basis in each market r, and
firms make decisions each month with respect to their choices for wholesale prices,
product variesties, and advertising expenditures.
4.4.1 Retailer Pricing Decisions
The vertical structure between manufacturers and retailers makes the two-
stage game complicated since two parties are both involved in choices of multiple
dimensions. However, the nature of direct-to-store delivery for bottled water prod-
ucts simplifies the game significantly. With direct-to-store distributors, retailers are
not responsible for shipping, stocking, and managing inventories. Instead, these
costs are borne by the manufacturers. Thus I can make two reasonable assumptions
based on the stylized facts of direct-to-store delivery: (1) retailers incur no marginal
cost for delivering bottled water products; (2) retailers do not choose products and
product varieties.
Consider a market r with the monopolist retailer R which sells differentiated
products (bottled water) for several manufacturers, the retailer’s profit of selling






rkt − pWrkt)Srkt, (4.7)
where Grt is the set of products available in market r at time t, Mrt is the market
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size of market r in time t, Srkt is the market share for product k in retailer R at
time t, pRrkt is the retail price of product k set by the retailer, and p
W
rkt denotes the
wholesale price set by corresponding manufacturers. 9 Remember, I assume there
is no marginal cost for retailers due to direct-to-store delivery. The marginal cost
of retailing transfers to the manufacturer side. Maximizing the profit function with








Following Villas-Boas (2007), define ΩRt as retailer R’s response matrix, which con-
tains the first order derivatives of product shares with respect to all retail prices in
market r at time t. Stacking the first order conditions above and rearranging them
yields a vector of monopolist retailer’s price-cost margins for all products it sells:
mR,monopolyrt = p
R
rt − pWrt = −ΩRt (prt)−1Srt, (4.9)
where mR,monopolyrt is the markup for a monopolist retailer in market r.
10 Given
demand estimates, observed market shares, and retail prices, I can back out the
retailer’s marginal cost (wholesale price) under the monopoly pricing assumption
according to equation (4.9).
9I assume market size Mrt of market r is constant in a given year, and it is 10% greater than
the maximum observed sales among bottled water category within each market. This definition of
market size is similar to Miller and Weinberg (2017) who look at the U.S. beer industry.
10Vectors and matrices are denoted as bold symbols in the remaining of this paper.
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4.4.2 Manufacturer Decisions
In the first stage of the game, each manufacturer chooses wholesale prices,
brand level advertising, and corresponding product varieties (number of UPCs) with
full information about how these decisions change the optimal behaviors of rival
manufacturers and the downstream retailer. In particular, the first order conditions
in equation (4.8) implicitly define equilibrium retail prices pR∗(pW ,Nupc,A), and
product shares S∗(pR∗(pW ,Nupc,A),Nupc,A), given the choices of manufacturers.
Notice that both product varietyNupc and brand advertisingA affect market shares
directly because consumer utility is a function of them, as well as indirectly through
retailer pricing decisions. Wholesale prices affect market shares through retailer
pricing decisions indirectly.
Suppose manufacturer m offers a bundle of products Grm, which contains Nm
products in a market r to a monopolist retailer at time t, the corresponding profit


















where Fjm(.) is manufacturer m’s fixed cost of offering brand-package pair j in each
market, HBjm(.) is manufacturer m’s fixed cost of advertising for brand Bj (j ∈ Bj).
Since Nupcjrt and ABjrt both affect consumer utilities in the demand side, I can view
product variety and advertising analogously to endogenous product characteristics.






with respect to product variety Nupcjrt is





and the slope of fixed cost function HBjm(ABjrt, ν
h
jrt; Γm) with respect to advertising
ABjrt is
H ′Bjm = (ΓmABjrt + ν
h
jrt)Mrt. (4.12)
Where νfjrt and ν
h
jrt are unobservables, Θm and Γm are parameters.
11 Equation
(4.11) and (4.12) implicitly determine the quadratic functional forms for product
variety and advertising fixed costs. In terms of the direct-to-store delivery, it is
natural to think that the shelf space in a supermarket or grocery store is limited
and fixed for each manufacturer, so manufacturers encounter some sort of fixed
opportunity costs of stocking an additional UPC. Considering advertising fixed cost,
Murry (2017) assumes manufacturers face convex fixed advertising cost, which nests
my quadratic functional form assumption. cWjrt represents the marginal costs of
production, shipping and distribution. I assume that the marginal cost is different
across products. The marginal cost of product j in market r of time r is then
parameterized as
cwjrt = Ψj + γr + ηt + ωjrt, (4.13)
where Ψj is a product fixed effect which reflects the mean marginal cost of each
product. γr and ηt are sets of region-specific and period-specific effects, and ωjrt is
11My fixed cost funciton differs from Fan (2013)’s specification by omitting the intercept term
in the slope and assuming fixed cost is proportional to the market size.
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unobservable cost shifters.
To accommodate the production cost change post-merger, I allow the marginal





Glaceau × 1{ Post-Merger}, j ∈ GGlaceau. (4.14)
where Ψprej measures Glaceau’s baseline production and distribution cost for prod-
uct j pre-merger, and ΨpostGlaceau measures the corresponding changes post-merger.






Glaceau × 1{ Post-Merger}. (4.15)
To rationalize the significant rise of Glaceau’s advertising expenditures in the post-






Glaceau × 1{ Post-Merger}. (4.16)
With the profit function specified in equation (4.10), and knowing that retailers
behave according to equation (4.9), a manufacturer’s optimal pricing, choice of
product varieties, and advertising can be found by taking the first order derivatives
with respect to pWjrt, N
upc
jrt , and ABjrt respectively.
12 By assuming a pure-strategy
12In reality, the measure for product variety (number of UPCs) Nupcjrt is a integer. Previous stud-
ies such as Sullivan (2016), use moment inequalities to simulate the upper and lower bound for the
fixed cost parameter. To simplify the analysis, I treat Nupcjrt as a continuous variable. Considering
the advertising first order condition, it does not hold with equality when advertising expenditure
is zero in the data. Since I estimate demand without supply restrictions, zero advertising expendi-
tures are not an issue here. As discussed by Murry (2017), the zero advertising expenditure is an
issue when one needs to back out manufacturers’ advertising costs and simulate counterfactuals.
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= ΓmABjrt + ν
h
jrt, ∀j ∈ Grm. (4.19)





rt ,Art) of product k in market r
at time t is a implicit function of wholesale prices, product varieties, and brand
level advertising. Focusing on FOCs of wholesale prices, a change in wholesale price
of a single product directly affects retail prices and further influence shares of all





















In addition to the pass-through effects on retail prices, product variety and adver-































Following Murry (2017), I do not back out advertising for manufacturers who do not advertise,
and keep their advertising expenditures at zeros in counterfactuals.
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Following Villas-Boas (2007), let T rt be a J by J matrix which describes manufac-
turers’ ownership for Jrt products in market r at time t. Specifically, T rt(j, k) = 1
if products j and k are produced by the same manufacturer, T rt(j, k) = 0, oth-
erwise. Define ∆Wrt , ∆
upc
rt , and ∆
A
rt as manufacturer’s response matrices in terms
of wholesale price, product varieties, and advertising, whose general elements are
∆Wrt (j, k) =
∂S∗krt
∂pWjrt
, ∆upcrt (j, k) =
∂S∗krt
∂Nupcjrt




systems of three Jrt by 1 FOCs can be expressed in matrix forms as
pWrt − cWrt = −(T rt ∗∆Wrt )−1Srt, (4.23)
(pWrt − cWrt )(T rt ∗∆
upc





(pWrt − cWrt )(T rt ∗∆Art) = Γrt ∗Art + νhrt, (4.25)
where Θrt and Γrt are Jrt by 1 vectors with element Θrt(j) = Θk and Γrt(j) = Γk,
if product j belongs to brand k. Adding the retailer’s pricing equation (4.9) to
manufacturer’s pricing equation (4.23), and replacing marginal cost with its pa-
rameterized form in equation (4.13) I get the supply side estimation equation for
marginal cost parameters:
pRrt −Ψrt − γr − ηt = −(T rt ∗∆Wrt )−1Srt − (ΩRrt)−1Srt + ωrt. (4.26)
Replacing manufacturer markups in equations (4.24) and (4.25) with the right-
hand side of equation (4.23), yields estimation equations for product variety and
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advertising fixed cost parameters.
4.4.3 Supply Estimation
Given the demand estimates and supply side specification, marginal cost and
fixed cost parameters Ξ = (Ψ,Θ,Γ) can be estimated with instrumental variable






rt are pre-calculated. Recall






rt is a Jrt by Jrt









rt, where Grt is a complicated matrix that involves calculation of the second-
order derivatives of shares with respect to retail prices.13 Similarly, I can pre-
calculate ∆upcrt and ∆
A
rt this way given demand estimates.
14
With pre-calculated markup terms, equation (4.26) is simply a linear equa-
tion of marginal cost variables, which can be estimated with ordinary least square
approach. For equations (4.24) and (4.25), manufacturers’ endogenous choices for
product varieties and advertising are very likely to be correlated with unobserved
cost νfrt and ν
h
rt respectively. I instrument product variety with the average product
variety of other regions within the same chain and its interaction with an indicator
that equals one for Coca-Cola and Glaceau in the post-merger period. Considering
endogenous advertising, I instrument it with the nationwide per-capital advertising
13Refer to Villas-Boas (2007)’s equation (4.9) for details. My specification differs from Villas-
Boas (2007) by defining a market as a region-retailer pair, so the retailer ownership matrix can be
dropped.
14Derivations of ∆upcrt and ∆
A
rt are similar to ∆
W
rt , which requires the computation of the second
order derivatives of the demand function, see Villas-Boas (2007) and Gayle (2013) for details.
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expenditure and its interaction with an indicator defined above. These instruments
are valid if unobserved costs νfrt and ν
h
rt are orthogonal to their corresponding in-
struments.
Table 18 provides the average retailer markups, manufacturer markups, and
recovered marginal costs based on equations (4.9), (4.23), and (4.26) with demand
estimates and observed data from January 2006 to December 2009. As shown in
the table, under monopolist retailer assumption the total channel variable profit
is almost evenly distributed between manufacturers and retailers. For example,
Aquafina’s markup is about $0.41 per liter and its relative retailer markup is about
$0.44 per liter. In general, cheaper brands have lower markups and marginal costs
while more expensive brands have higher counterparts. On average, Vitaminwater is
the most expensive brand and also yields the highest manufacturer markup, retailer
markup, and marginal cost, which are $0.43, $0.47, and $1.15 per liter respectively.
Table 19 presents the supply-side estimation results. For the supply-side esti-
mation, consistent with earlier discussion, I discard the data between February 2007
and November 2007 to exclude the noises when the merger was under negotiation,
and allow for the realization of efficiencies. Columns (i)-(iii) provide key parameter
estimates for marginal cost, product variety and advertising fixed cost estimation
equations. As expected, the merger indeed raises Glaceau’s marginal cost, product
variety and advertising efficiencies by reducing corresponding cost parameters. As
shown, the average marginal cost of Glaceau products reduces by 8.36 cents per liter
post-merger controlling for other fixed effects. In particular, for single-pack Vitam-
inwater, the merger decreases the marginal cost by about 7.2%. The merger has a
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significant impact on Vitaminwater’s product variety efficiency, which decreases its
relevant fixed cost parameter by 19.4%. This result may partly explain the observed
data trend in which product variety of Vitaminwater increases in the post-merger
period. Turning to the advertising efficiency, I find the merger reduces the adver-
tising fixed cost parameter for Vitaminwater largely by 79.2% on average, which is
likely to explain Glaceau’s advertising spikes in the post-merger period.
4.5 Counterfactual Analysis
With both demand and supply side estimates, I can now use counterfactual
analysis to study how the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau would affect the market
outcomes. I perform 5 counterfactual scenarios under different merger efficiency and
synergy assumptions:
(1) The merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau does not occur.
(2) The merger occurs with only a unilateral effect.
(3) The merger occurs with both unilateral effect and marginal cost efficiency.
(4) The merger occurs with both unilateral effect and product variety fixed
cost efficiency.
(5) The merger occurs with both unilateral effect and advertising fixed cost
efficiency.
To calculate post-merger outcomes under different merger assumptions I resolve re-
tailers and manufacturers’ optimal decisions under vertical relationships for each
market. To be consistent with my supply model I assume manufacturers move
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first, and the equilibria are solved by using a two-step procedure. First, given a
guess of wholesale prices, product varieties, and advertising intensities the monop-
olist retailer solves for the corresponding optimal retail prices that maximizes its
total profits. Second, manufacturers take retailer’s optimal pricing decisions into
consideration and solve for their optimal wholesale prices, product varieties, and
advertising intensities respectively.15 The two-step procedure continues until the
manufacturers’ optimal choices converge to the guess of equilibria in the first step.
Due to the large sample size and computational burden to solve the equilibria, the
counterfactual analyses in the rest of this paper will focus on the top 20 retail chains
which cover the most DMA regions.16
4.5.1 The Predicted Trends of Vitaminwater
In figures 23-26 I predict the brand-level retail price, product variety, adver-
tising intensity, and market share of Vitaminwater under 4 scenarios starting from
January 2006 to December 2009. The vertical solid blue line indicates the time at
February 2007 and the dash red line signifies the time at November 2007. Consistent
with supply-side estimation, I drop data between February 2007 to November 2007
to allow for the merger negotiation, consummation, and realization of efficiencies
on Glaceau. I exclude scenario (2) from the figures because the unilateral effects
15Similar to Murry (2017), I only solve advertising intensity when it is positive in the real
data. For brands with zero advertising expenditures in a given market, I assume their advertising
expenditures are zero and do not solve their advertising first order conditions.
16These top 20 retailer chains operate business in several DMA regions, and I rank them based
on the number of DMA regions they cover. Out of 91 DMA regions in the estimation sample, the
top 1 retailer covers 71 DMA regions and the 20th retailer covers 8. The selected retailers account
for 8243 markets (75.31% of the sample markets).
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are very small in this merger case. The results show that the predicted equilibrium
outcomes under all 4 counterfactual scenarios are almost identical to the observed
real data in the pre-merger period, which justifies the model performance. The
reported retail price in figure 23 is the average brand level retail price weighted
by product volumes. I find prices in scenario (3) are nearly the same as the real
prices, and prices in scenarios (4) and (5) are almost the same as prices in the “no
merger” scenario. These two findings suggest marginal cost reduction plays a dom-
inant role in affecting Vitaminwater’s equilibrium prices post-merger. However, the
magnitudes of the marginal cost efficiency in prices are small, which implies limited
market power of the merger.
Figure 24 shows the average product variety (number of UPCs) of Vitamin-
water across sample regions and retailer chains. As shown, product varieties yield
stable upward time trends and the observed product varieties in the post-merger
periods are higher than the predicted product varieties of all other counterfactual
scenarios. Compared to the “no merger” scenario, both marginal cost and prod-
uct variety efficiency scenarios generate significant higher product varieties, but the
magnitude of the product variety efficiency scenario is closer to the observed data.
On average, the merger increases product varieties by about 16.7% and 22.7% under
marginal cost and product variety efficiency scenarios respectively, relative to the
“no merger” baseline.
Figure 25 plots the average per-capita advertising expenditure across sam-
ple regions. It shows that Vitaminwater’s advertising decisions are quite seasonal
and usually spike between spring and summer. In the post-merger periods, ad-
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vertising expenditures are much lower under the “no merger” scenario than their
counterparts in the real data, which suggests merger actually increases advertising of
Vitaminwater. However, except advertising efficiency, other efficiencies do not have
significant effects on firm’s advertising expenditures. During November 2007 to De-
cember 2009, relative to the “no merger” baseline, the merger with only advertising
efficiency raises advertising by 173.7%.
Figure 26 presents the market shares of Vitaminwater under 4 counterfactual
scenarios. In the post-merger period, market shares in the “no merger” scenario
are substantially lower than in the real data and appear to track the pre-merger
trend. Among all merger efficiencies, the marginal cost efficiency plays the biggest
role in raising market shares and product variety efficiency yields a slightly lower
magnitude than marginal cost efficiency in increasing market shares. Advertising
efficiency has limited impacts on market shares of Vitaminwater.
4.5.2 Mean Effects Under Different Merger Scenarios
Table 20 provides the mean equilibrium wholesale prices, product varieties,
and per-capita advertising across 20 retailer chains under different merger scenar-
ios. All numbers in the table are for year 2009, which is the final year of the sample.
Column (i) presents the equilibrium outcome values of the “no merger” baseline.
The numbers in columns (ii) to (vi) are calculated based on the counterfactual out-
comes of scenarios (2)-(5) and the real data respectively, and denote the percentage
changes relative to corresponding values in column (i). In general, I find the merger
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has small effects on the equilibrium outcomes of other brands, which is due to small
inside good share and weak substitution effects across brands. Comparing columns
(i) and (ii) I find the merger with only unilateral effects yields very limited market
power which increases the wholesale prices of all brands by less than 1%, while it has
significant effects on Dasani product varieties and advertising by decreasing them
by 3.74% and 18.85% respectively. This suggests the merging party re-maximizes
its total profits by strategically shifting resources from the lower markup brands to
the higher markup brands. A comparison of columns (i) and (iii) reveals that the
merger with marginal cost efficiency decreases wholesale prices of Smartwater and
Vitaminwater by 9.54% and 6.01%, while it simultaneously raises their correspond-
ing product varieties by 22.10% and 15.52% respectively. In addition, the merger
reduces Smartwater advertising by 38.02% to offset its increased fixed cost of prod-
uct variety, and increases other brands’ average product varieties and advertising.
On the contrary to scenario (iii), scenario (iv) reduces both product varieties and ad-
vertising of other brands relative to the “no merger” scenario. However, the merger
with product variety efficiency increases Vitaminwater product variety significantly,
by 22.89% relative to the “no merger” baseline. The comparison between columns
(i) and (v) reveals that advertising efficiency plays trivial roles in affecting wholesale
prices and product varieties but significant roles in affecting advertising.
Numbers in column (vi) are calculated based on the observed data, which re-
flect the merger with all three efficiency effects. It is evidenced that the merger
reduces wholesale prices of Glaceau brands primarily through marginal cost effi-
ciency and raises product varieties of Glaceau brands through both marginal cost
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and product variety efficiencies. On average, I find the merger decreases Smartwater
and Vitaminwater wholesale prices by 9.35% and 5.86%, and increases their corre-
sponding product varieties by 25.44% and 44.52% respectively relative to the “no
merger” scenario in 2009. Additionally, I also identify a strong boost in Vitaminwa-
ter advertising through merger which raises per-capita advertising expenditure by
322.43% comparing to the “no merger” baseline. To maximize total profits of the
merging party, the merger internalizes competitions by increasing Dasani wholesale
prices and reducing its product variety and advertising. However, the merger has
insignificant effects on the equilibrium outcomes of non-flavored brands. Consid-
ering flavored brands, the effects of merger on wholesale prices are trivial, but the
merger plays positive roles in affecting product varieties and advertising.
Analogous to table 20, table 21 provides equilibrium retail prices, market
shares, per-unit net profits, and changes of consumer surplus under different counter-
factual scenarios. Since retailers determine retail prices by responding to manufac-
turers’ optimal behaviors, retail prices are simultaneously affected by manufacturers’
wholesale prices, product varieties, and advertising. In general, results suggest that
under different merger scenarios, retail prices of Smartwater, Vitaminwater, and
Dasani change in the same direction as changes in wholesale prices relative to the
“no merger” scenario. A comparison of columns (i) and (ii) reveals that the merger
with only unilateral effect yields higher market power and thus increases prices. To-
gether with product variety and advertising changes reported in column (ii) of table
20, increased retail prices result in market share drops in Smartwater, Vitaminwa-
ter, and Dasani relative to the numbers in column (i). However, the merger under
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scenario (ii) is not profitable for the merging party since it reduces Dasani’s per-unit
net profit significantly by 8.42% relative to the “no merger” scenario, which con-
tradicts the outcome of horizontal merger with Bertrand competition. Notice that
manufacturers compete not only in prices but also product varieties, it is straight-
forward to associate competition in product varieties with Cournot competition,
since product varieties affect outputs (shares) positively and directly. It is known
that horizontal merger with Cournot competition yields a “merger paradox” that
the merger tends to reduce output which is not profitable for the merging party
unless it forms a monopoly post-merger. In my case, Dasani’s gains from increased
price with Bertrand competition are heavily offset by the corresponding losses from
reduced product varieties with Cournot competition. Focusing on column (iii) I
find the merger with marginal cost efficiency raises the market shares of Smartwater
and Vitaminwater by 69.13% and 51.75% compared to the “no merger” baseline,
which are primarily attributed to the price reduction and product variety incre-
ment of these brands. Unlike merger under scenario (ii), the merger is profitable
for Glaceau and the entire merging party because the net gain from Glaceau brands
is much larger than the loss from Dasani. As expected, the merger with product
variety efficiency affects Vitaminwater market share and profit most significantly,
but yields limited effects on other brands. Even though the merger under scenario
(iv) reduces the profit of Dasani relative to the “no merger” baseline, the merger is
still profitable since the lost profit from Dasani is compensated by the much larger
profit gains from Vitaminwater. The comparison between columns (ii) and (v) sug-
gests relatively small effects of advertising efficiency on shares and profits. Specially,
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the merger with advertising efficiency raises Smartwater and Vitaminwater profit by
3.81% and 10.44% relative to the “no merger” baseline.
Column (vi) presents the scenario where the merger occurs with all three effi-
ciencies. Compared to the “no merger” scenario, the merger decreases Smartwater
and Vitaminwater retail prices by 6.98% and 4.72%, and increases retail prices of
Dasani, non-flavored, and flavored brands by 0.87%, 0.18%, and 0.27% respectively.
The shares of Smartwater and Vitaminwater boost strikingly, which can be at-
tributed to price reductions, product variety increases, and advertising increments.
In particular, the merger increases market shares of Smartwater and Vitaminwater
by 59.91% and 89.73% relative to the “no merger” baseline. Compared to other
scenarios, the merger with all three efficiencies generates the highest total profit for
the merging party, it also increases profits of both non-flavored and flavored brands
on average. Unlike most of the existing antitrust literature that find exclusively
“bad” effects of merger, my results suggest the merger can be “good” for both the
merging party and rivals with efficiencies and non-price dimensions of competitions.
For consumer welfare, column (ii) shows the merger with only unilateral effects
decreases consumer surplus by 1.06% relative to the “no merger” baseline. This
finding is consistent with other antitrust literature focusing on unilateral effects of
merger. Scenario (i) is neither profitable for the merging party nor harmless to
consumers, which is unlikely to occur. I find consumer surplus varies substantially
under different efficiency effects. For instance, columns (ii) and (iii) reveal that the
marginal cost efficiency raises consumer surplus by 25.25%, and columns (ii) and (v)
suggest that the advertising efficiency raises consumer surplus by 0.89%. Finally, the
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observed merger in column (vi) is predicted to increase consumer surplus by 30.12%
relative to the “no merger” baseline, which suggests the merger of Coco-Cola and
Glaceau is beneficial to consumers and justifies DOJ’s quick decision to approve the
merger.
4.6 Conclusion
I empirically investigate how merger efficiencies affect equilibrium market out-
comes considering both price and non-price competitions. This study focuses on
the merger of Coca-Cola and Glaceau in the U.S. premium bottled water industry
and explores the underlying mechanism that rationalizes Glaceau’s increases in mar-
ket shares, product varieties, and advertising expenditures post-merger. Without
obvious systematic price reductions post-merger, the dramatic increasing share of
Glaceau products is difficult to explain by the traditional model of Nash-Bertrand
competition. The plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that premium bot-
tled water manufacturers compete in both price and non-price dimensions.
To understand the merger effects on the “weaker” merging party, Glaceau, I
develop a structural model of differentiated products which incorporates both price
and non-price competition effects and consider the post-merger efficiency variations
of Glaceau in marginal cost, product variety fixed cost, and advertising fixed cost.
My supply estimates suggest the merger indeed increases Glaceau’s efficiencies across
all three aspects by reducing corresponding cost parameters post-merger. With both
demand and supply estimates, I implement several counterfactual scenarios to sepa-
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rately identify the effects of merger under different efficiencies. I find product variety
and advertising fixed efficiency play primary roles in affecting manufacturers’ equi-
librium choices for product variety and advertising respectively, while marginal cost
efficiency plays not only the dominant role in affecting equilibrium prices but also an
important role in affecting equilibrium product variety. In particular, for the year
2009, I find comparing to the “no merger” scenario, the merger with observed data
(1) reduces Glaceau’s retail prices by 4.72%-6.98%, which is primarily attributed
to marginal cost efficiency; (2) increases Glaceau’s product varieties by 25.44%-
44.52% through both marginal cost and product variety fixed cost efficiencies; (3)
raises Glaceau’s advertising by 144.06% to 322.43% through advertising fixed cost
efficiency; and (4) boosts Glaceau’s market shares by 59.91%-89.73%. My findings
also suggest the merger increases consumer surplus by 30.12% compared to the “no
merger” baseline.
In an industry with multi-dimension competitions, price effects and market
power may not be the only aspects that an antitrust agency should focus on. In
fact, non-price effects, such as product variety, quality, and advertising, and their
relevant efficiency gains through merger may increase a merging party’s market
share significantly with little price variations. Thus the mergers that seem to have
had negative consequences may actually yield benefits to the consumers when ef-
ficiencies exist. Unlike the case in this paper, if goods or services of an industry
are highly substitutable, a merger with non-price effects and efficiencies would gain
market shares from competing goods rather than creating new demand, thus hurt
competing firms. My study provides a novel approach of evaluating merger from a
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more comprehensive perspective by considering both price and non-price competi-
tions and their related efficiency effects of merger. Future studies may extend the
framework to other industries which share similar features with premium bottled
water.
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Average Retail Price Per Chain
Note: The month index starts from January 2006 and ends in December 2009.
Prices are measured in 2006 U.S. dollars per liter, which is adjusted by monthly
non-alcoholic beverage CPI (year 2006=100). Each dot in the figure represents
the average value across 52 retailer chains and 92 DMA regions in a given
month.
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Average Market Share Per Chain
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across 52 retailer
chains and 92 DMA regions in a given month. To calculate market shares, I
restrict water products to the Nielsen “Water Bottled” category, and calculate
the total quantities of “Water Bottled” sold in each market (region-retailer
pair) each month. The market size of each market is defined as 1.1 times the
corresponding maximum monthly total quantities of “Water Bottled” in a given
year.
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Note: This figure plots the brand level average retail prices of Vitaminwater
products. Brand-level retail price is the average price of each product weighted
by their corresponding market shares. “merger-scenario 1” denotes merger
occurs with only unilateral effect. Each dot in the figure represents its average
value across top 20 retailer chains and their relevant DMA regions in a given
month. In the pre-merger period, equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios are
overlapping.
106






















Note: This figure plots the brand level average market share of Vitaminwater
products. Market shares are the summations of their product level counter-
parts. “merger-scenario 1” denotes merger occurs with only unilateral effect.
Each dot in the figure represents its average value across top 20 retailer chains
and their relevant DMA regions in a given month. In the pre-merger period,
equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios are overlapping.
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Note: This figure plots the brand level average per-unit profit of Vitaminwater
products, which is computed as the multiplication of markups and market
shares. The “real” profits are not observable in the data, and “real data” in
the figure are calculated based on the observed market shares and recovered
manufacturer’s price-cost margins. “merger-scenario 1” denotes merger occurs
with only unilateral effect. Each dot in the figure represents its average value
across top 20 retailer chains and their relevant DMA regions in a given month.
In the pre-merger period, equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios are overlapping.
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Average Retail Price Per Chain
Note: The month index starts from January 2006 and ends in December 2009.
Prices are measured in 2006 U.S. dollars per liter, which is adjusted by monthly
non-alcoholic beverage CPI (year 2006=100). Each dot in the figure represents
the average value across 52 retailer chains and 92 DMA regions in a given
month.
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Average Market Share Per Chain
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across 52 retailer
chains and 92 DMA regions in a given month. To calculate market shares, I
restrict water products to the Nielsen “Water Bottled” category, and calculate
the total quantities of “Water Bottled” sold in each market (region-retailer
pair) each month. The market size of each market is defined as 1.1 times the
corresponding maximum monthly total quantities of “Water Bottled” in a given
year.
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Average Retail Price Per Chain-Atlanta
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Retail Price Per Chain-Houston
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Retail Price Per Chain-San Francisco
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Retail Price Per Chain-Philadelphia
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
114




















Average Market Share Per Chain-Atlanta
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Market Share Per Chain-Houston
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Market Share Per Chain-San Francisco
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Market Share Per Chain-Philadelphia
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Total Number of UPCs Nationwide
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the total number of UPCs of each brand
sold in a given month nationwide.
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Average Product Variety Per Chain
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across 52 retailer
chains and 92 DMA regions in a given month.
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Average Product Variety Per Chain-Atlanta
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Product Variety Per Chain-Houston
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
122






















Average Product Variety Per Chain-San Francisco
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Average Product Variety Per Chain-Philadelphia
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the average value across retailers in the
local DMA region in a given month.
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Per Capita Advertising Expenditure
Note: Each dot in the figure represents the per-capita advertising expenditure
in a given month, which is calculated by dividing the total national advertising
expenditure by the U.S. population.
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Note: This figure plots the brand level average retail prices of Vitaminwater
products. Brand-level retail price is the average price of each product weighted
by their corresponding market shares. “Scenario 3” denotes merger occurs with
both unilateral effect and marginal cost efficiency; “Scenario 4” denotes merger
occurs with both unilateral effect and product variety fixed cost efficiency;
“Scenario 5” denotes merger occurs with both unilateral effect and advertising
fixed cost efficiency. Each dot in the figure represents its average value across
top 20 retailer chains and their relevant DMA regions in a given month. In the
pre-merger period, equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios are overlapping.
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Note: This figure plots the brand level average number of UPCs of Vitaminwa-
ter products. The number of UPCs are the summations of their product level
counterparts. “Scenario 3” denotes merger occurs with both unilateral effect
and marginal cost efficiency; “Scenario 4” denotes merger occurs with both
unilateral effect and product variety fixed cost efficiency; “Scenario 5” denotes
merger occurs with both unilateral effect and advertising fixed cost efficiency.
Each dot in the figure represents its average value across top 20 retailer chains
and their relevant DMA regions in a given month. In the pre-merger period,
equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios are overlapping.
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Note: This figure plots the national level per-capital advertising expenditures
of Vitaminwater products. “Scenario 3” denotes merger occurs with both uni-
lateral effect and marginal cost efficiency; “Scenario 4” denotes merger occurs
with both unilateral effect and product variety fixed cost efficiency; “Scenario
5” denotes merger occurs with both unilateral effect and advertising fixed cost
efficiency. Each dot in the figure represents its average value across top 20
retailer chains and their relevant DMA regions in a given month. In the pre-
merger period, equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios are overlapping.
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Note: This figure plots the average market share of Vitaminwater products.
Market shares are the summations of their product level counterparts. “Sce-
nario 3” denotes merger occurs with both unilateral effect and marginal cost
efficiency; “Scenario 4” denotes merger occurs with both unilateral effect and
product variety fixed cost efficiency; “Scenario 5” denotes merger occurs with
both unilateral effect and advertising fixed cost efficiency. Each dot in the
figure represents its average value across top 20 retailer chains and their rel-
evant DMA regions in a given month. In the pre-merger period, equilibrium
outcomes of all scenarios are overlapping.
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Table 1: Demand Estimates for Logit and Random Coefficient Logit Model
Variable parameter Model
Logit RCL
Price α -2.140 (0.043) -5.536 (0.158)
Demographic Interactions
Income × Price 1.024 (0.049)
Income × Constant -1.727 (0.085)
Income × Multi-pack 0.176 (0.034)
Mean Own-price Elasticity -3.42 -3.79
Note: There are 146,107 observations at the brand-package-region-retailer-month-year level. Both
regressions include product (brand-package pair), region, and time fixed effects. For the RCL
specification, 100% of the estimated individual price coefficients are negative.
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Table 2: Mean Own-Price and Cross-Price Elasticities for 16 Products (Brand-
Package Pairs)
Brand-package (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Aquafina s -4.310 0.006 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.013 -2.649 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.019
(3) Dasani s 0.013 0.006 -4.389 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(4) Evian s 0.014 0.007 0.013 -3.961 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.012
(5) Evian m 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.002 -3.661 0.003 0.005 0.011
(6) Fiji s 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.004 -4.043 0.005 0.011
(7) Fiji m 0.013 0.005 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.003 -4.080 0.011
(8) Fruit2O m 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006 -2.609
(9) Smartwater s 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.015
(10) Smartwater m 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.011
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.013 0.006 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(13) Propel s 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.011
(14) Propel m 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.019
(15) Sobe Life s 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(16) Sobe Life m 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.013
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product.These price elas-
ticities are calculated based on the random coefficient model, formulas are given by Nevo
(2000). All prices are deflated by nonalcoholic beverage consumer index (year 2006=100), and
are measured as U.S. dollars per liter.
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Table 3: Mean Own-Price and Cross-Price Elasticities for 16 Products (Continued)
Brand-package (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Aquafina s 0.009 0.002 0.040 0.005 0.014 0.018 0.011 0.001
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.013 0.002 0.042 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.011 0.001
(3) Dasani s 0.008 0.002 0.040 0.005 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.001
(4) Evian s 0.010 0.002 0.043 0.006 0.016 0.019 0.011 0.001
(5) Evian m 0.010 0.002 0.043 0.005 0.016 0.019 0.011 0.001
(6) Fiji s 0.010 0.002 0.045 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.001
(7) Fiji m 0.008 0.002 0.042 0.009 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.002
(8) Fruit2O m 0.010 0.002 0.036 0.011 0.013 0.030 0.011 0.002
(9) Smartwater s -3.318 0.002 0.048 0.005 0.019 0.023 0.014 0.001
(10) Smartwater m 0.010 -3.743 0.046 0.005 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.001
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.009 0.002 -4.325 0.005 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.001
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.007 0.002 0.041 -4.505 0.010 0.014 0.011 0.002
(13) Propel s 0.012 0.002 0.045 0.005 -3.707 0.021 0.013 0.001
(14) Propel m 0.012 0.002 0.043 0.008 0.018 -3.060 0.013 0.002
(15) Sobe Life s 0.009 0.002 0.041 0.005 0.013 0.017 -4.234 0.001
(16) Sobe Life m 0.007 0.002 0.043 0.010 0.009 0.018 0.009 -3.994
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product.These price elas-
ticities are calculated based on the random coefficient model, formulas are given by Nevo
(2000). All prices are deflated by nonalcoholic beverage consumer index (year 2006=100), and
are measured as U.S. dollars per liter.
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Table 4: Mean Diversion Ratios of Inside Products and Outside Good
Brand-package (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Aquafina s 96.55 0.28 0.29 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.49
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.28 96.21 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.72
(3) Dasani s 0.33 0.28 96.52 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.49
(4) Evian s 0.33 0.29 0.28 95.98 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.52
(5) Evian m 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.06 96.03 0.08 0.12 0.49
(6) Fiji s 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.06 0.13 95.81 0.12 0.48
(7) Fiji m 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.06 0.13 0.09 96.00 0.62
(8) Fruit2O m 0.25 0.46 0.25 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.13 96.73
(9) Smartwater s 0.31 0.40 0.27 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.62
(10) Smartwater m 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.49
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.47
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.30 0.25 0.28 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.58
(13) Propel s 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.49
(14) Propel m 0.31 0.38 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.89
(15) Sobe Life s 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.46
(16) Sobe Life m 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.69
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product. The diagonal
elements denote the diversion to the outside good. Numbers represent percentage values and
elements in each row should sum to 100 in theory. Since the values in table 4 are calculated
from the mean of each market, the summation of row elements cannot be exactly equal to 100.
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Table 5: Mean Diversion Ratios of Inside Products and Outside Good (Continued)
Brand-package (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Aquafina s 0.32 0.05 0.95 0.12 0.44 0.65 0.28 0.03
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.42 0.05 0.86 0.09 0.42 0.80 0.25 0.03
(3) Dasani s 0.31 0.05 0.95 0.12 0.44 0.65 0.28 0.03
(4) Evian s 0.36 0.05 0.98 0.11 0.48 0.65 0.28 0.03
(5) Evian m 0.36 0.06 0.99 0.10 0.47 0.66 0.28 0.02
(6) Fiji s 0.37 0.05 1.06 0.11 0.50 0.62 0.30 0.03
(7) Fiji m 0.32 0.05 1.05 0.21 0.46 0.66 0.29 0.05
(8) Fruit2O m 0.30 0.05 0.73 0.23 0.36 0.98 0.24 0.05
(9) Smartwater s 95.89 0.05 0.99 0.09 0.52 0.74 0.30 0.03
(10) Smartwater m 0.38 95.64 1.08 0.10 0.42 0.64 0.32 0.03
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.33 0.05 96.95 0.12 0.44 0.64 0.29 0.03
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.29 0.06 1.11 96.17 0.36 0.61 0.31 0.05
(13) Propel s 0.40 0.05 1.00 0.10 96.24 0.69 0.31 0.03
(14) Propel m 0.40 0.05 0.93 0.18 0.51 96.53 0.29 0.04
(15) Sobe Life s 0.34 0.05 0.98 0.11 0.41 0.63 96.29 0.03
(16) Sobe Life m 0.30 0.05 1.10 0.25 0.29 0.73 0.24 95.85
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product. The diagonal
elements denote the diversion to the outside good. Numbers represent percentage values and
elements in each row should sum to 100 in theory. Since the values in table 5 are calculated
from the mean of each market, the summation of row elements cannot be exactly equal to 100.
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Table 6: Average Markups and Recovered Marginal Cost
Brand Manufacturer Retailer Marginal Retail
Markup Markup Cost Price
Aquafina 0.408 0.453 1.022 1.883
Aquafina Splash 0.354 0.388 0.240 0.982
Dasani 0.409 0.457 1.070 1.936
Evian 0.378 0.434 0.779 1.592
Fiji 0.398 0.458 0.923 1.779
Fruit2O 0.342 0.384 0.239 0.965
Smartwater 0.374 0.415 0.599 1.389
Vitaminwater 0.428 0.479 1.136 2.043
Propel 0.371 0.409 0.536 1.317
Sobe 0.410 0.457 0.970 1.837
Note: All numbers here are measured in 2006 U.S. dollars per liter.
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Table 7: Supply-Side Estimates
Variable Cost-side Estimates
Dummy Smart. Single 0.6040
0.0124)
Dummy Smart. Multi 0.8607
(0.0127)
Dummy Vitamin. Single 1.1486
(0.0125)
Dummy Vitamin. Multi 1.3778
(0.0125)
Glaceau × PostMerger -0.0604
(0.0040)
Note: There are 146,107 observations at the brand-package-chain-region-month-year level,
which covers 13,304 markets (chain-region-year-month). In addition to variables presented
in the table, the regression includes fixed effects of other products, region-specific and time-
specific fixed effects.
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Table 8: Counterfactual Results Under Different Scenarios
Uni. Eff. N Y Y
Marg. Eff. N N Y
Value % Changes to Scenario (i)
Merger Scenarios (i) (ii) (iii)
Wholesale Prices
Smartwater 0.926 0.27% -6.91%
Vitaminwater 1.412 0.16% -4.58%
Dasani 1.461 0.72% 0.15%
Non-flavored 1.328 0.00% 0.02%
Flavored 0.776 0.00% 0.02%
Retail Prices
Smartwater 1.318 0.20% -5.26%
Vitaminwater 1.855 0.13% -3.80%
Dasani 1.904 0.60% 0.18%
Non-flavored 1.767 -0.01% 0.08%
Flavored 1.164 -0.01% 0.11%
Note: This table provides average wholesale and retail prices at the brand-chain-region
level of 20 retailer chains which cover most DMA regions. The numbers in column
(i) are calculated assuming the merger never happened. The numbers in column (ii)
are calculated assuming the merger occurs with only unilateral effects. Column (iii)
denotes the real data and relevant predictions.
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Table 9: Counterfactual Results Under Different Scenarios (Continued)
Uni. Eff. N Y Y
Marg. Eff. N N Y
Value % Changes to Scenario (i)
Merger Scenarios (i) (ii) (iii)
Market Shares
Smartwater 0.37% -0.82% 19.44%
Vitaminwater 0.81% -0.64% 17.50%
Dasani 0.29% -3.19% -1.23%
Non-flavored 0.18% 0.06% -0.61%
Flavored 0.56% 0.05% -0.60%
Profits
Smartwater 1.552 0.03% 17.91%
Vitaminwater 4.196 0.02% 15.66%
Dasani 1.065 -0.04% -0.56%
Non-flavored 0.901 0.04% -0.53%
Flavored 2.073 0.04% -0.56%
Consumer Surplus
-0.96% 13.51%
Note: This table provides average market shares and per-unit net profit at the brand-
chain-region level of 20 retailer chains which cover most DMA regions. The numbers
in column (i) are calculated assuming the merger never happened. The numbers in
column (ii) are calculated assuming the merger occurs with only unilateral effects.
Column (iii) denotes the real data and relevant predictions. The “profit” values re-
ported in column (i) denote the per-unit net profit of each brand. The total net profit
of each brand can be obtained by multiplying it by the market size of a given market
(the unit of market size is 1,000 liters).
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Table 10: Market Shares of Top Flagship Brands
Brand Manufacturer Market Share
Aquafina Pepsi 0.0724
Auafina Splash Pepsi 0.0023
Nestle Spring Nestle 0.2860
Crystal Geyser CG Roxane LLC 0.0560
Retailer Own Brand 0.3275
Dasani Coca-Cola 0.0735
Evian Danone 0.0037
Fiji Fiji Water LCC 0.0042
Fruit2O Sunny Delight Beverages Co 0.0040
Smartwater Glaceau (Coca-Cola) 0.0053
Vitaminwater Glaceau (Coca-Cola) 0.0239
Nestle Pure Life Nestle 0.0209
Propel Pepsi 0.0142
Sobe Life Pepsi 0.0033
Note: The shares listed in the table are national market shares calculated based on the Nielsen
Retailer Scanner Data in 2008. With the full samples in the Nielsen Retailer Scanner Data of year
2008, I aggregate all the observed quantities sold to brand-year level (within the “Water-Bottled”
category), and divide each brand’s aggregated annual quantities by the summation over all brands.
Arrowhead, Deer Park, Ice Mountain, Ozarka, Poland Spring, and Zephyrhills are all brands of
Nestle spring water, that are marketed in different regions of U.S. Since it is rare to find these
brands in the same market (region-retailer pair), I treat them as the same brand across regions
and assign a common name “Nestle Spring”.
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Table 11: Demand Estimates for Logit and Random Coefficient Logit Model
Variable parameter Model
Logit RCL
Price α -2.095 (0.039) -5.355 (0.141)
Product variety (flavored) θdf 1.055 (0.029) 1.014 (0.028)
Product variety (non-flavored) θdnf 1.323 (0.082) 1.409 (0.083)
Advertising θa 0.048 (0.003) 0.052 (0.003)
Demographic Interactions
Income × Price 0.956 (0.044)
Income × Constant -1.613 (0.077)
Income × Multi-pack 0.213 (0.031)
Mean Own-price Elasticity -3.34 -3.82
Note: There are 146,107 observations at the brand-package-region-retailer-month-year level. Both
regressions include product (brand-package pair), region, and time fixed effects. For the RCL
specification, 100% of the estimated individual price coefficients are negative.
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Table 12: Mean Own-Price and Cross-Price Elasticities for 16 Products (Brand-
Package Pairs)
Brand-package (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Aquafina s -4.388 0.006 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.011
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.013 -2.604 0.013 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.016
(3) Dasani s 0.014 0.006 -4.474 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.011
(4) Evian s 0.014 0.006 0.013 -4.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.011
(5) Evian m 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.002 -3.670 0.003 0.005 0.011
(6) Fiji s 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.002 0.004 -4.095 0.005 0.010
(7) Fiji m 0.013 0.005 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.003 -4.133 0.011
(8) Fruit2O m 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006 -2.566
(9) Smartwater s 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.014
(10) Smartwater m 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.010
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.013 0.006 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.010
(13) Propel s 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.011
(14) Propel m 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.017
(15) Sobe Life s 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010
(16) Sobe Life m 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.012
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product.These price elas-
ticities are calculated based on the random coefficient model, formulas are given by Nevo
(2000). All prices are deflated by nonalcoholic beverage consumer index (year 2006=100), and
are measured as U.S. dollars per liter.
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Table 13: Mean Own-Price and Cross-Price Elasticities for 16 Products (Continued)
Brand-package (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Aquafina s 0.009 0.002 0.041 0.006 0.015 0.018 0.011 0.001
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.012 0.002 0.042 0.005 0.014 0.023 0.011 0.001
(3) Dasani s 0.008 0.002 0.041 0.006 0.014 0.018 0.011 0.001
(4) Evian s 0.010 0.002 0.044 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.001
(5) Evian m 0.009 0.002 0.043 0.005 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.001
(6) Fiji s 0.010 0.002 0.046 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.001
(7) Fiji m 0.008 0.002 0.043 0.009 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.002
(8) Fruit2O m 0.009 0.002 0.036 0.010 0.013 0.027 0.011 0.002
(9) Smartwater s -3.309 0.002 0.048 0.005 0.018 0.022 0.014 0.001
(10) Smartwater m 0.010 -3.758 0.046 0.005 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.001
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.009 0.002 -4.408 0.006 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.001
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.007 0.002 0.042 -4.619 0.010 0.014 0.011 0.002
(13) Propel s 0.011 0.002 0.046 0.005 -3.728 0.020 0.013 0.001
(14) Propel m 0.011 0.002 0.043 0.008 0.017 -3.031 0.013 0.002
(15) Sobe Life s 0.009 0.002 0.042 0.005 0.013 0.017 -4.308 0.001
(16) Sobe Life m 0.007 0.002 0.044 0.010 0.009 0.018 0.009 -4.045
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product.These price elas-
ticities are calculated based on the random coefficient model, formulas are given by Nevo
(2000). All prices are deflated by nonalcoholic beverage consumer index (year 2006=100), and
are measured as U.S. dollars per liter.
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Table 14: Mean Diversion Ratios of Inside Products and Outside Good
Brand-package (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Aquafina s 96.56 0.28 0.30 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.49
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.28 96.35 0.25 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.65
(3) Dasani s 0.33 0.28 96.53 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.48
(4) Evian s 0.33 0.28 0.29 96.02 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.50
(5) Evian m 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.06 96.08 0.08 0.13 0.47
(6) Fiji s 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.06 0.12 95.84 0.12 0.46
(7) Fiji m 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.06 0.13 0.09 96.03 0.60
(8) Fruit2O m 0.25 0.41 0.26 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 96.86
(9) Smartwater s 0.31 0.37 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.58
(10) Smartwater m 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.47
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.46
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.56
(13) Propel s 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.46
(14) Propel m 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.80
(15) Sobe Life s 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.45
(16) Sobe Life m 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.66
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product. The diagonal
elements denote the diversion to the outside good. Numbers represent percentage values and
elements in each row should sum to 100 in theory. Since the values in table 14 are calculated
from the mean of each market, the summation of row elements cannot be exactly equal to 100.
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Table 15: Mean Diversion Ratios of Inside Products and Outside Good (Continued)
Brand-package (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Aquafina s 0.32 0.05 0.95 0.12 0.44 0.64 0.28 0.03
(2) Aquafina Splash m 0.38 0.05 0.87 0.10 0.40 0.74 0.25 0.03
(3) Dasani s 0.31 0.05 0.95 0.12 0.44 0.64 0.28 0.03
(4) Evian s 0.35 0.05 0.99 0.11 0.47 0.64 0.28 0.03
(5) Evian m 0.35 0.05 1.00 0.10 0.46 0.64 0.28 0.02
(6) Fiji s 0.36 0.05 1.06 0.11 0.50 0.61 0.30 0.03
(7) Fiji m 0.32 0.05 1.06 0.21 0.46 0.65 0.29 0.05
(8) Fruit2O m 0.28 0.05 0.74 0.22 0.34 0.89 0.23 0.05
(9) Smartwater s 95.99 0.05 1.00 0.09 0.50 0.70 0.30 0.03
(10) Smartwater m 0.36 95.70 1.09 0.11 0.41 0.62 0.32 0.03
(11) Vitaminwater s 0.33 0.05 96.97 0.12 0.44 0.63 0.29 0.03
(12) Vitaminwater m 0.29 0.06 1.11 96.17 0.35 0.61 0.31 0.05
(13) Propel s 0.39 0.05 1.00 0.10 96.30 0.67 0.31 0.03
(14) Propel m 0.37 0.05 0.94 0.18 0.49 96.64 0.29 0.04
(15) Sobe Life s 0.34 0.05 0.99 0.11 0.40 0.62 96.32 0.03
(16) Sobe Life m 0.29 0.05 1.11 0.25 0.29 0.72 0.24 95.89
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product. The diagonal
elements denote the diversion to the outside good. Numbers represent percentage values and
elements in each row should sum to 100 in theory. Since the values in table 15 are calculated
from the mean of each market, the summation of row elements cannot be exactly equal to 100.
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Table 16: Mean Advertising Elasticities for 16 Products (Brand-Package Pairs)
Brand-package (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Aquafina s 0.0207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(2) Aquafina Splash m -0.0001 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(3) Dasani s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(4) Evian s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(5) Evian m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(6) Fiji s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 -0.0001
(7) Fiji m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 -0.0001
(8) Fruit2O m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0151
(9) Smartwater s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(10) Smartwater m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(11) Vitaminwater s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(12) Vitaminwater m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(13) Propel s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(14) Propel m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(15) Sobe Life s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(16) Sobe Life m -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product. These adver-
tising elasticities are calculated based on the logit model. The advertising expenditures are
deflated by the consumer index (year 2006=100), and are measured as U.S. cents per-capita.
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Table 17: Mean Advertising Elasticities for 16 Products (Continued)
Brand-package (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Aquafina s -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0000
(2) Aquafina Splash m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0000
(3) Dasani s -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0000
(4) Evian s -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000
(5) Evian m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000
(6) Fiji s -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000
(7) Fiji m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000
(8) Fruit2O m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0000
(9) Smartwater s 0.0250 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000
(10) Smartwater m -0.0001 0.0251 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000
(11) Vitaminwater s -0.0001 0.0000 0.0516 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000
(12) Vitaminwater m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0563 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000
(13) Propel s -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0759 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000
(14) Propel m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0871 -0.0001 0.0000
(15) Sobe Life s -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0304 0.0000
(16) Sobe Life m -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0345
Note: “s” denotes single-bottle product and “m” denotes multi-pack product. These adver-
tising elasticities are calculated based on the logit model. The advertising expenditures are
deflated by the consumer index (year 2006=100), and are measured as U.S. cents per-capita.
146
Table 18: Average Markups and Recovered Marginal Cost
Brand Manufacturer Retailer Marginal Retail
Markup Markup Cost Price
Aquafina 0.407 0.444 1.032 1.883
Aquafina Splash 0.362 0.394 0.226 0.982
Dasani 0.408 0.448 1.080 1.936
Evian 0.381 0.431 0.780 1.592
Fiji 0.399 0.452 0.928 1.779
Fruit2O 0.350 0.389 0.225 0.965
Smartwater 0.379 0.414 0.596 1.389
Vitaminwater 0.426 0.468 1.148 2.043
Propel 0.377 0.410 0.531 1.317
Sobe Life 0.410 0.449 0.977 1.837
Note: All numbers here are measured in 2006 U.S. dollars per liter.
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Table 19: Supply-Side Estimates
Variable Estimation Equation
Marginal Cost Product Variety Advertising
(i) (ii) (iii)
Dummy Smart. Single 0.6103
(0.0088)
Dummy Smart. Multi 0.8753
(0.0092)
Dummy Vitamin. Single 1.1561
(0.0090)
Dummy Vitamin. Multi 1.3984
(0.0100)
Dummy Smart. 0.4201 0.1832
(0.0050) (0.0224)
Dummy Vitamin. 0.0391 0.1850
(0.0013) (0.0198)
Glaceau × Post Merger -0.0836 -0.0076 -0.1349
(0.0049) (0.0013) (0.0199)
Note: Estimates in product variety and advertising equations are relative small in magnitudes,
numbers presented in columns (ii) and (iii) are multiplied by 1000. There are 121,408 ob-
servations at the brand-package-chain-region-month-year level, which covers 10,945 markets
(chain-region-year-month). In addition to variables presented in the table, all regressions in-
clude fixed effect of other products/brands. Regression in column (i) also includes region and
time fixed effects.
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Table 20: Counterfactual Results Under Different Scenarios
Uni. Eff. N Y Y Y Y Y
Marg. Eff. N N Y N N Y
Vari. Eff. N N N Y N Y
Ad. Eff. N N N N Y Y
Value % Changes Relative to No Merger Scenario (i)
Merger Scenarios (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Wholesale Prices
Smartwater 0.952 0.26% -9.54% 0.36% 0.25% -9.35%
Vitaminwater 1.439 0.14% -6.01% 0.21% 0.16% -5.86%
Dasani 1.468 0.44% 0.72% 0.51% 0.46% 0.86%
Non-flavored 1.334 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Flavored 0.773 0.00% 0.03% -0.01% 0.00% 0.03%
No.UPCs
Smartwater 2.276 -0.52% 22.10% 1.32% 0.43% 25.44%
Vitaminwater 10.027 0.28% 15.52% 22.89% 1.29% 44.52%
Dasani 3.081 -3.74% -1.22% -4.08% -3.39% -1.46%
Non-flavored 2.310 -0.04% 0.81% -0.20% 0.23% 0.64%
Flavored 6.760 0.05% 0.69% -0.01% 0.25% 0.66%
Advertising
Smartwater 0.111 1.86% -38.02% 2.62% 203.21% 144.06%
Vitaminwater 0.254 -0.10% -2.47% 1.95% 222.05% 322.43%
Dasani 0.177 -18.85% -13.18% -21.10% -17.52% -13.25%
Non-flavored 0.006 0.66% 1.26% -2.95% 3.83% -0.92%
Flavored 0.139 0.38% 7.29% -0.82% 1.86% 14.27%
Note: This table provides average wholesale prices, number of UPCs, and per-capita
advertising expenditure at the brand-chain-region level of 20 retailer chains which cover
most DMA regions. The numbers in column (i) are calculated assuming the merger
never happened. The numbers in column (ii) are calculated assuming the merger
occurs with only unilateral effects. Columns (iii)-(iv) represent merger scenarios under
different efficiency or synergy effects. Column (vi) denotes the real data and relevant
predictions. I don’t observe wholesale prices in the data, the numbers reported in
above are obtained by equation (4.9) with demand estimates.
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Table 21: Counterfactual Results Under Different Scenarios (Continued)
Uni. Eff. N Y Y Y Y Y
Marg. Eff. N N Y N N Y
Vari. Eff. N N N Y N Y
Ad. Eff. N N N N Y Y
Value % Changes Relative to No Merger Scenario (i)
Merger Scenarios (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Retail Prices
Smartwater 1.345 0.19% -7.20% 0.30% 0.19% -6.98%
Vitaminwater 1.875 0.11% -4.90% 0.20% 0.14% -4.72%
Dasani 1.902 0.37% 0.70% 0.44% 0.38% 0.87%
Non-flavored 1.766 -0.01% 0.12% 0.02% 0.00% 0.18%
Flavored 1.162 -0.01% 0.19% 0.02% 0.01% 0.27%
Market Share
Smartwater 0.27% -0.74% 53.83% 0.95% 1.40% 59.91%
Vitaminwater 0.50% 0.01% 50.87% 20.13% 5.59% 89.73%
Dasani 0.29% -8.27% -4.42% -9.08% -7.62% -4.74%
Non-flavored 0.17% -0.20% 2.37% -0.54% 0.65% 2.38%
Flavored 0.55% 0.12% -0.16% -0.23% 0.13% -0.20%
Profit
Smartwater 1.030 -0.33% 69.13% 1.69% 3.81% 80.08%
Vitaminwater 2.540 0.60% 51.75% 21.22% 10.44% 91.23%
Dasani 1.117 -8.42% -4.59% -9.38% -7.99% -5.53%
Non-flavored 0.872 0.06% 3.64% -0.39% 1.65% 3.13%
Flavored 2.082 0.13% 0.12% -0.27% 0.19% 0.68%
Consumer Surplus
-1.06% 24.19% 0.95% -0.17% 30.12%
Note: This table provides average retail prices, market shares, and per-unit net profit
at the brand-chain-region level of 20 retailer chains which cover most DMA regions.
The numbers in column (i) are calculated assuming the merger never happened. The
numbers in column (ii) are calculated assuming the merger occurs with only unilateral
effects. Columns (iii)-(iv) represent merger scenarios under different efficiency or syn-
ergy effects. Column (vi) denotes the real data and relevant predictions. The “profit”
values reported in column (i) denote the per-unit net profit of each brand. The total
net profit of each brand can be obtained by multiplying it by the market size of a given
market (the unit of market size is 1,000 liters).
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Appendix A: Derivation of ∆p matrix








Following Villas-Boas (2007), totally differentiating equation (A1) with respect to

























dpWn = 0 (A2)























1Drop region and time subscripts for convenience.
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Since the retailer’s price-cost margin (pR − pW ) can be expressed as ΩR(p)−1S(p),
the matrix G can be decomposed into two part to increase the speed of calculation:
G = G1 +G2, (A4)























(pRm − pWm )
]
. (A6)
Let ΩRn be a J by 1 vector with element Ω
R
n (j, n) =
∂Sn
∂pRj
. For a given wholesale
price pWn , equation (A2) is computed for all J products. Thus these J equations in
(A2) can be expressed as
GdpR − ΩRndpWn = 0. (A7)
Then the n-th column of ∆p is
dpR
dpWn
= G−1ΩRn . (A8)
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Stacking all J vectors we have matrix ∆p
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Céline Bonnet and Pierre Dubois. Inference on vertical contracts between manufac-
turers and retailers allowing for rnonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance.
The Rand Journal Economics, 41 (1):139–164, 2010.
154
Paul B. Ellickson, Pianpian Kong, and Mitchell J. Lovett. Private labels and retailer
profitability: Bilateral bargaining in the grocery channel. September 2017.
Oliver E. Williamson. Economies as an antitrust defense: The welfare tradeoffs.
The American Economic Review, 58 (1):18–36, 1968.
Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel S. Hosken, and Matthew C. Weinberg. Efficiencies
brewed: Pricing and consolidation in the us beer industry. The Rand Journal
Economics, 46 (2):328–361, 2015.
Robert Kulick. Horizontal mergers, prices, and productivity. November 2017.
Philip G. Gayle. On the efficiency of codeshare contracts between airlines: Is double
marginalization eliminated? The American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
5 (4):244–273, 2013.
Jerry Hausman. Valuation of new goods under perfect and imperfect competition. In
The Economics of New Goods, pages 207–248. National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Inc, 1996. URL https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberch:
6068.
Nathan H. Miller and Matthew C. Weinberg. Understanding the price effects of the
millercoors joint venture. Econometrica, 85 (6):1763–1791, 2017.
Christopher T. Conlon and Julie Holland Mortimer. Empirical properties of diver-
sion ratios. July 2018.
Matthew Grennan. Price discrimination and bargaining: Empirical evidence from
medical devices. American Economic Review, 103 (1):145–177, 2013.
Steven Berry. Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. The
RAND Journal of Economics, 25 (2):242–262, 1994.
Steven Berry, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. Voluntary export restraints on
automobiles: Evaluating a trade policy. American Economic Review, 89 (3):400–
430, 1999.
Mathias Reynaert and Frank Verboven. Improving the performance of random coeffi-
cients demand models: The role of optimal instruments. Journal of Econometrics,
179 (1):83–98, 2014.
Steven T Berry and Philip Haile. Identification in differentiated products markets.
Working Paper 21500, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. URL http:
//www.nber.org/papers/w21500.
Christopher J. Sullivan. The ice cream split: Empirically distinguishing price and
product space collusion. November 2016.
Charles Murry. Advertising in vertical relationships: An equilibrium model of the
automobile industry. January 2017.
155
Amil Petrin. Quantifying the benefits of new products: The case of the minivan.
Journal of Political Economy, 110 (4):705–729, 2002.
K. Sudhir. Structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic
retailer. Marketing Science, 20(3):244–264, 2001.
Gregory T. Gundlach and Diana L. Moss. Non-price effects of mergers: Introduction
and overview. The Antitrust Bulletin, 63 (2):155–168, 2018.
John Kwoka and Shawn Kilpatrick. Nonprice effects of mergers: Issues and evidence.
The Antitrust Bulletin, 63 (2):169–182, 2018.
Federico Ciliberto, Charles Murry, and Elie Tamer. Market structure and competi-
tion in airline markets. May 2016.
Yuqing Zheng and Harry M. Kaiser. Estimating asymmetric advertising response:
An application to u.s. nonalcoholic beverage demand. Journal of Agricultural and
Applied Economics, 40(3):837–849, 2008.
156
